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Preface

Welcome to Volume XXVII of the Trinity College Social and Political Review. Since its founding, the SPR has given some of Trinity College Dublin’s most critical thinkers an outlet to engage and invoke readers on issues of social and political importance.

In the year following the publication of Volume XXVI, the global political landscape has altered dramatically. The announcement of Brexit, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States and contentious elections upcoming in France and the Netherlands have caused tremors throughout the world. This is, of course, happening alongside an on-going conflict in Syria, the most severe refugee crisis to face Europe since World War II, and global efforts to mitigate climate change. Now, more than ever, we need courageous and informed voices to stand up and speak out.

This year, students from across the academic spectrum in Trinity submitted thought-provoking and riveting pieces. Throughout the Journal are articles that tackle a range of subjects, such as conflict, social theory, and issues of development, with a critical lens. Several political puzzles and social anomalies are presented to us, before being meticulously dissected and explored by the author. This includes the relationship between tax havens and development in less developed countries, an exploration of the tactics employed by the Irish Republican Army and barriers to migrant integration. These articles represent a heightened level of engagement with pressing historical and current issues among Trinity’s community.

At this point, I would like to thank the dedicated team of people that made the publication of the SPR this year possible. This includes the student team driving the Journal: the Editorial Board who offered insightful and precise observations throughout the editing process; Deputy Editor Aisling for her artistic flare; and General Manager Anna and Financial Officer Hannah for their tireless work, enthusiasm and dedication throughout the year. Furthermore, I would like to extend my thanks to our advisors Dr. Jacqueline Hayden and Dr. Elaine Moriarty for their guidance, the Departments of Political Science and Sociology for their unwavering support, and Global Officer Helen Murray for her advice. The Board would also like to say thank you to Grehan’s Printers for their support in producing the Review.

I very much hope you enjoy reading this volume as much as I have. It has been a pleasure to serve as Editor-in-Chief and I look forward to reading the Social and Political Review for years to come.

Alexandra Trant, Sch.
Editor-in-Chief
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Social Protection and the End of Poverty: the Dual-Track Dynamic

Chloé Desjonquères

Introduction

Social protection, along with the need for increased partnerships, is one of the most important features of the recently launched Sustainable Development Goals. The first goal: “End poverty in all of its forms everywhere” includes social protection as its third target: “Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable”. At the Addis Ababa Financing for Development Conference, the 12th point of the resulting Action Agenda emphasizes yet again the commitment of the United Nations by “Delivering social protection and essential public services for all”. In contrast, the International Labor Organization has estimated that “only 27% of the global population enjoys access to comprehensive social security systems, whereas 73% are covered partially or not at all” (ILO 2014, p.xxi)

There are at least two schools of thought when addressing social protection in a context of widespread poverty; those who address social protection as a public good that should be nationally or even globally provided (Murphy & Walsh, 2014), and those that focus on social nets and mutual insurance in securing assets (Ray, 1998; Townsend, 1994). This article argues that while most national and global development agendas focus on macro-level insurance, because their strengths and weaknesses are mutually reinforcing, macro and micro-level social protection systems form, together, a dual-track dynamic that contributes to the alleviation of poverty in all of its forms.

The Case for Social Protection

When referring to extreme poverty, one measurement is the purely economic threshold of $1.25 a day. The World Bank has recently updated it to $1.90 (World Bank, 2015); people living below this daily income level cannot access and afford basic necessities and as such are deemed to be extremely poor. This new poverty line has already faced a wide range of criticism, as it still weakly defines poverty (Hoy, 2015), ignoring non-economic and context-specific aspects to poverty. In contrast, Murphy & Walsh (2014) argue that poverty is not a measurable stock of people, commonly referred to as the bottom billion (Collier, 2007). Rather, it is a dynamic flow of people that are vulnerable in their assets, which they estimate at 5.1 billion people. It comprises those in structural poverty, who are below the poverty line and can hardly get out of it, as well as the vulnerable, who are subject to shifts in and out of poverty (Murphy & Walsh, 2014). Sen (1981) has developed a framework that explains vulnerability based on endowments - what a household has, and its entitlements – the household’s consumption bundle, and what it can afford. Shocks can hit households in unpredictable manners, and these shocks create asset depletion. Asset depletion leads to a reduction in endowments, and as such entitlements are reduced. If endowments and entitlements are reduced to the point where the household cannot afford and/or access its basic survival needs, it falls in the ‘starvation set’.

Risks and shocks are global features of human livelihood, whether one lives in a developed or developing country. A way to mitigate the risks of falling within the starvation set and of becoming vulnerable is through comprehensive social protection.
Social protection does not have one commonly agreed upon definition. On the one hand, the World Bank (2012) views social protection as a tool that is complementary to other systems and policies, and defines it as follows: “Social protection (and labor systems, policies, and programs) helps individuals and societies manage risk and volatility and protect them from poverty and destitution—through instruments that improve resilience, equity, and opportunity.” On the other hand, the ILO (2014) characterizes social protection as a set of policies, which it defines as “the set of public measures that a society provides for its members to protect them against economic and social distress that would be caused by the absence or a substantial reduction of income from work as a result of various contingencies (sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age, and death of the breadwinner), the provision of health care, and the provision of benefits for families with children” (Fonteneau & Ongevalle, 2015).

One way social protection can mitigate risks and volatility while ending poverty is through insurance, one of its most important subsets. Insurance was defined by D. Ray (1998 p.615) as “the provision of funds to smooth out unexpected variations in income or in consumption needs.” This essay focuses on social protection as a means to ensure consumption smoothing at the household level because it is at the heart of comprehensive social protection systems. The United Nations Food & Agricultural Organization, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the World Food Program got together and demonstrated that beyond evening-out incomes and mitigating risk, consumption smoothing through social protection helps households to diversify their nutritional status, increasing their productivity level, and encouraging a savings-investment dynamic that further widens the cycle lifting them out of poverty (2015). Additionally, D. Leblanc (2015) has ranked goals by the number of other goals to which it is connected, and Goal #12: “Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns” comes first, as it is linked with 14 other goals. Consumption smoothing is correlated with and complementary to many goals linked to poverty.

To end poverty, social protection needs to be inclusive, equitable, and efficient. In order to be efficient, based on the First Theorem of Welfare Economics, the system needs to make everybody better off without making anyone worse off (Sen 1993), both in scope, from the best to the worst kind of shock, and in coverage, from the most to the least well off, throughout their lifetime. In order to be inclusive, no one should be left behind. To be equitable, it should fairly benefit the rich, the poor, as well as the disabled, elderly, and children. Only then will we have achieved Pareto Efficiency, the point at which resources are allocated such that one cannot possibly make any one individual better off without making at least one other individual worse off. As detailed by Murphy & Walsh (2014), the Second Welfare Theorem’s first best outcome, to redistribute all of the resources equally amongst the population, is unrealistic given the non-radically egalitarian nature of society. As such, equity can be achieved as a second best outcome, which is redistribution through social protection.

National Social Protection: Formal Macro Perspective

Individuals have heterogeneous levels of risk, and in order to mitigate these risks efficiently and equitably, an ideal social protection scheme must provide for a large number of beneficiaries in order to diversify risks and sustain itself in the long-term. One way to achieve that is through national insurance. Under ideal circumstances, the wealthier part of the population, which is risk averse, will be able and willing to contribute to a social protection scheme. Over the long term, this can create a fund that will eventually enable the state to provide equal protection to those that cannot afford it or cannot contribute under a non-contributory scheme.

However, there are drawbacks to such national ideals. Most developing countries do not have such systems in place because of a lack of capacity, weak institutions, and a general lack of trust in governments, amongst other challenges. According to UNICEF, “given the high rates of poverty, the large proportion of the population in the informal sector and the weak administrative capacity in the region, the difficulties associated with implementing SHI schemes are formidable” (2009, p.15). A national insurance system requires extensive partnerships between the government and society, which is hardly conceivable given the current institutional situation of the Global South. Additionally, there is a timeline constraint. National household surveys only take place every couple
of years, making them inefficient in case of short-term shocks necessitating quick relief systems, and as such it will take years for the system to be self-enforcing and efficient.

A macro-level social protection scheme could, by itself, and in a perfect world, end poverty in all of its forms. However, if one is to achieve this by the next few decades, it is important to consider other forms of insurance that get over the weaknesses of the national system.

Sub-National Social Protection: Informal Micro Perspective

Informal risk-sharing schemes, at the individual and community level, have the capacity to overcome macro-level formal schemes’ weaknesses on a small scale. Mutual insurance is an informal practice based on existing social networks. This system implies high levels of social cohesion and trust between individuals (Robert Putnam), reciprocity, and enforcement mechanisms through social sanctions. There are important assumptions to take into account: there needs to be independent incomes, and a negatively correlated risk factor, or, as stated by Townsend (1994), no co-movements in idiosyncratic shocks amongst the individuals or households involved. Should they not hold, mutual compensation mechanisms would not be feasible.

The advantages of mutual insurance schemes are that they cover some of the weaknesses of national social protection in developing country contexts; social cohesion tends to be higher at the community level than at the national level, and higher levels of trust lead to decreased information asymmetries and adverse selection issues. Institutionally, mutual insurance also reduces the principal-agent problem faced by national governments, which often have to rely on partnerships with local governments, the private sector, and NGOs for policy implementation. Random shocks can significantly alter a household structure, and while national support may take time because of initially weak institutions and information asymmetries, efficient community-level schemes have the capacity to provide immediate support. There are also major limitations to such systems. Sustainability is one issue, on the one hand because individuals are complex and social interactions are highly volatile, and on the other hand because in case a common shock hits the community, no one is protected anymore. Additionally, adverse selection - the fact that the riskiest people will join the insurance scheme, as well as moral hazard – over-utilization of the financially limited scheme, also pose threat to sustainability (UNICEF 2009, p.13). Another issue is that it is limited in scale; the greater the number of people involved, the lower the level of trust amongst the group. Finally there is an equity issue because people who are unable to contribute can hardly benefit from a common pot or mutual arrangement, that is, the elderly and disabled, and children to some extent.

Conclusion: The Dual-Track Dynamic

There is a mutually reinforcing interplay between national and community-level insurance schemes. While nation-wide social protection is a large-scale, sustainable, and by combining a contributory and non-contributory systems, more equitable and long-term efficient system, community-level insurance is more efficient in the short term, and benefits from a reduction of the principal-agent problem, information asymmetries, and higher levels of trust.

From a policy perspective, and to get over initial governance and capacity constraints, non-governmental actors, governments, the private sector, and civil society, need to form partnerships in order to support both macro and micro-level social protection systems. Ahead of and during the implementation of social protection schemes, both formal and informal systems will form a dual-track dynamic that will contribute to a reduction of poverty, with informal arrangements remaining active and efficient during initial phases of the national implementation. Over time it is expected that the national system will be strong and flexible enough to become the main provider of social protection, while informal practices will be reduced as a minor contributory system.

One concern could be the assessment and evaluation of informal practices. Townsend (1994) has proven the existence of mutual insurance systems in villages in India when there exists idiosyncratic shocks, whereby the households consumption bundles co-move with the average village consumption, rather than independently from each other. Mobarak & Rosenzweig (2013) have demonstrated that there are interplays between formal insurance, informal arrangements, and ex-ante and ex-post risk taking, supporting the argument that rather than being separate practices, these schemes exist alongside one
another. Additionally, mutual insurance systems can be supported by local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Community Concern Uganda, which implemented a Group Savings Program for women in Ugandan villages. They initially provide financial education to the women involved and find that 100% of the participants repaid the money borrowed. This community financial mechanism is an example of a semi-formal mutual social-protection scheme, and shows that there is scope for partnership between society and NGOs, governments, international organizations, and the private sector in enabling a comprehensive social protection system.

Social projection can end poverty in all its forms, but it requires the dual-track dynamic outlined in this essay to get around the shortcomings of either system being used exclusively.

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Exploring Endogenous and Exogenous Explanations of Failed Peace Processes in Sri Lanka

Shíofra Jeyasundaram

Introduction

The Sri-Lankan Civil War is recognised in modern history as one of the most entrenched, polarised and drawn-out conflicts worldwide (Hulse, 2016). Following the systematic oppression and human rights violations of minority groups such as the North-Eastern Tamils in Sri-Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) staged an intermittent insurgency in July 1983, marking the beginning of a violent, twenty-six-year conflict. The complex nature of the conflict should not be simplified; it is not solely ethnic, religious or territorial – it is all of the above, as well as being constitutional, economic, diplomatic and political. Although several attempts at peace negotiations were made throughout the drawn-out period of the conflict, these peace processes ultimately failed to secure a sustainable agreement, resulting in the continuous breakdown of peace
talks and consequent renewal of warfare. Section I of this paper will evaluate the contributing influence of endogenous factors, such as ethnic and religious divisions, historical political inequalities and conflicting viewpoints and aims between the two main protagonists of the violence: the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Section II of this paper shifts towards more exogenous explanations of the failed peace processes, by critically assessing the failure of the international community to unite and intervene in the conflict, particularly due to their ulterior economic interests and political allegiances (Shinoda, 2011). A combination of both the endogenous and exogenous factors evaluated ultimately can be blamed for the breakdown of peace negotiations, and renewal of conflict in Sri Lanka.

Section I: Endogenous Factors

Ethnic Tensions and the Emergence of the LTTE

The complexity of the Sri Lankan conflict is undeniable; while it is ethnic in nature, it is both political and structural too. Although the war officially broke out in July 1983, ethnic tensions between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority communities can be traced back as early as the 19th century, with Britain's introduction of a plantation economy to Sri Lanka (then known as British Ceylon). Although the British plantation system must be recognised for the way in which it revolutionised the Ceylonese economy, the social consequences of such a system must not be overlooked. Given the reluctance among the Sinhalese population to participate in the harsh labour, low wages, and exploitative nature of the plantations, British planters recruited 'coolies' (South Indian Tamils), as a cheap source of labour for the plantation enterprise (Wickramasinghe and Cameron, 2005). Forrest (1967) estimates that more than two million Tamil workers migrated to Ceylon's planting districts between 1837 and 1874, therefore significantly shifting Ceylon's complex multi-ethnic demography, and creating a subsequent threat of a 'Tamil minority complex' amongst the Sinhalese population. The reality of this threat was further consolidated through British colonial policy, as a disproportionate number of Tamils were appointed to the top civil service jobs.

From the state's inception in 1948, ethnic and social divisions that developed throughout colonial rule, were further consolidated through the unequal distribution of political power. Following rushed processes of decolonisation, the establishment of a 'first past the post' electoral system ensured that Sri Lanka's first independent government would be held by the Sinhala-Buddhist majority (Insight on Conflict, 2013). Ethnic minorities in the state, such as the native Hindu Tamils, the immigrant Christian South-Indian Tamils, or the Muslim Sri-Lankan Moors became increasingly repressed, particularly through the introduction of legislation which consolidated Sinhalese-Buddhist hegemony, and restricted the basic rights of minority groups (Fernando, 2016). For example, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 denied citizenship to Indian-Tamil immigrants, therefore denying their lawful right to vote, whilst the Sinhala Only Act of 1956 reinforced Sinhalese supremacy, by declaring Sinhalese as Sri Lanka's official language, and consequently limiting many civil service jobs to citizens fluent in Sinhalese (Brown and Ganguly, 2003). As the government continued to perpetrate discriminatory, anti-Tamil legislation, ethnic tension between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities naturally erupted into violence in 1958. Despite powerful political riots and a country-wide pogrom against the Tamil people engulfing the nation, it took the government five days to declare a state of emergency and bring an end to the conflict (Vittachi, 1958).

John Darby, in his book Political Violence: An Overview, argues that tension between ethnic groups can only escalate into violence, if it is not resolved by the state (2012). However, in cases such as that of Sri Lanka, the state, as the main perpetrator of violence, lacked the incentive to resolve tensions, and instead continued to institutionally favour the Sinhalese population. The failure of the state to identify the existing ethnic-based imbalances of power and correct them politically, can be identified as the prime reason for the eruption of a structural ethnic-based violence against the Tamil people, as well as the subsequent emergence of the LTTE armed insurgency in Sri Lanka.

Political Inequality & Initial Peace Negotiations (1994)

From the onset of the civil war in 1983, the Sinhalese population were therefore naturally advantaged by their overwhelming power in the Sri Lankan government, and therefore further advantaged by the legitimacy of their 'statehood' within the international sphere (Fernando, 2016). As the LTTE demanded a fully independent 'Tamil Eelam' state for the North-Eastern Tamil
areas in Sri-Lanka, the movement gained massive support from the international Tamil diaspora due to the continuous oppression and violence against Tamil civilians in the 1970s and 80s. As violence in the state continued to escalate, both parties participated in ‘egregious violations’ of human rights (excessive use of militant force on civilian populations, and carrying out political killings with impunity (International Crisis Group, 2006). Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the Sri Lankan government protected them in the eyes of international politics, enabling them the power to exercise unlimited authority over their territory, and reach out for assistance from other governments and international bodies. As a result, the actions of the LTTE were labelled as ‘terrorist’ and ‘anarchistic’, while those mirrored actions of the government viewed upon as ‘necessary steps’ towards ending the ‘rebellion conflict’.

Due to their advantageous position within the international political sphere, the Sinhala-run government did not feel threatened by the LTTE uprising, and as a result, did not take initial peace mediation attempts seriously. In analysing the peace negotiations of 1994-1995, failure was inevitable as both parties lacked ‘substantive agendas or monitoring mechanisms’ to facilitate the development of a sustainable peace effort (Action Group of Tamils in the US, 1995). As a result, the LTTE were forced to make a number of concessions in an attempt to reach a peace agreement that would benefit and protect the Tamil people – most notably their public announcement to concede the demand for an independent state, and instead accept a more ‘federal solution’. Despite such gestures of goodwill on the Tamil side, the Sri-Lankan government continued to restrict travel, trade and territory, undermining previous agreements stating that restrictions would be lifted, whilst increasing their warfare budget by 27% and recruiting military personnel to their armed forces (Action Group of Tamils in the US, 1995). From the onset of the peace negotiations, the government hid behind a façade of willingness to cooperate, of which they were praised from the international community, while in reality they made no meaningful efforts towards achieving a sustainable agreement with the LTTE. As a result of the Sri-Lankan government’s failure to take negotiations seriously, and their incapability to implement their side of agreements, both parties failed to reach a settlement to end the conflict, thus resulting in the withdrawal from negotiations and cessation of hostilities in April 1995. Perhaps most important of this initial set of mediation efforts, was that it highlighted the crucial necessity for foreign assistance and international pressure in future peace efforts in Sri-Lanka.

Section II: Exogenous Factors

It is widely accepted within the study of political violence that one of the best methods of successfully ending a civil war is found through the aid of third party intervention, which ultimately introduces the possibility of achieving a negotiated settlement, as opposed to a military victory by either opposing side (Black-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce, 2008). In the case of Sri-Lanka, the extensive involvement of the international community ultimately failed to resolve the conflict – despite the recognised necessity for ‘sustained international engagement’ in renewing and facilitating peace processes (International Crisis Group, 2006). By contrasting approaches for conflict resolution between the liberal paradigms of European Union and Norway, compared to the military paradigms of America, China and India, we analyse how a conflict of interests ultimately resulted in the international community’s failure to unite and intervene in the conflict.

Norwegian Facilitation and Liberal EU Peace Efforts

Noting the failure to agree to an internal peace settlement during the 1994 negotiations, both protagonists highlighted the necessity for a third-party facilitator to aid further negotiation processes in the state (Dayaratne, 2011). Norway, upon approach by both parties in 1997, accepted the role as foreign facilitator and worked closely with both government and LTTE representatives to seek a solution to the ongoing conflict in the state. Throughout the following five years, Norway helped rebuild political relations between the two polarised communities, eventually culminating in the establishment of the Sri-Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) in 2002, along with the support of other Scandinavian countries and the EU (Lund and McDonald, 2015). Following twenty years of violent conflict where up to 70,000 people had lost their lives, Norway successfully brokered a cease-fire agreement between the LTTE and government forces in 2002, in the hopes of achieving a political settlement to end the military offensive (International Crisis Group, 2006). As a ‘soft power mediator’, Norway facilitated discussions for political solutions that would satisfy both parties – the most promising of these was that of a federal system, which would offer extensive autonomy to the North and East Tamil areas, without allowing for a secession.
The EU assisted with Norway’s role by launching the ‘European Initiative for a Negotiated Peace in Sri Lanka’, which would host a series of negotiations in Geneva between 2002 and 2006, to reach a ‘political solution’ to what was accepted as an ‘ethnic-based political conflict’. With the EU recognising the necessity that both parties were represented equally, both the LTTE and government fully participated in discussions for conflict resolution – the LTTE even travelled to EU countries such as Ireland to explore models of devolution of power. Although the two main protagonists, and the stakeholders involved in settling the confrontation, faced fundamental difficulties, all parties believed there was a realistic possibility of developing a successful political solution (Shinoda, 2011). If Norway and the EU had been the only international actors involved, this truly may have been the case. Despite holding the role of facilitator, diplomatic broker, arbiter of ceasefire and actor in humanitarian projects for 12 years, from 1997 to 2009, Norway, and the EU, failed the Sri-Lankan people.

International Military Support: America, Britain and India

While the significant progress of Norwegian and European peace efforts must be acknowledged, their failure can be accounted to the overwhelming influence of the military paradigms of the US and Britain. As one of the most accessible and strategically located trade points in the world, Sri-Lanka's shipping ports have, for centuries, been of massive economic interest to superpowers worldwide (Fernando, 2016). Noting this, the Sri-Lankan government was able to exploit this interest, and their ability to negotiate with other governments due to their legitimacy as a state, to mobilise military support from countries such as America, China, Pakistan, Iran and India, in exchange for access to vital trade routes. Built on ‘Westphalian notions of sovereignty’ and non-compliance with ‘terrorism’, much of the international community supported a ‘military solution’ to what was regarded as a ‘threat to Sri-Lanka’s national sovereignty’, as opposed to a political conflict (Goodhand, Klem and Sorbo, 2011).

Over the course of their involvement in resolving the Sri-Lankan conflict, the US participated in what can only be described as political cynicism or hypocrisy (Fernando, 2016). Whilst advocating for the ‘disarmament’ of the LTTE, they financially supported the reformation and upgrade of government forces, sending US marines based in South-East Asia to train Sri-Lankan security officers. While the EU sent peacekeeping troops, as part of the EU ceasefire monitoring mission, the US sent security teams to discuss military tactics with government forces. The most detrimental action, however, taken by the US, was their labelling of the LTTE as a ‘banned terrorist organisation’; fuelled by Washington’s ‘global war on terrorism’ and therefore resulting in the LTTE’s exclusion from International peace talks during the ceasefire in 2003 (Jones, 2011). Despite considerable progress to address economic, political, military and constitutional challenges over the course of six rounds of negotiations, previous to the implementation of this exclusion, talks broke down in April 2003, due to the enormous negligence of international stakeholders to actively involve the LTTE. Under immense pressure from the US and Britain, the EU similarly labels the LTTE as a ‘terrorist organisation’ in 2005, banning official LTTE peace delegations from attending future peace talks and therefore reversing all progress made by previous European liberal peace attempts (EINPSL, 2005).

Despite further calls by the LTTE for the International community to hold a greater role in ending the conflict, they repeatedly fail to secure a peace negotiation and bring an end to the conflict in Sri-Lanka. Any remnants of a political relationship between the LTTE and government quickly disintegrated, as the government refuses to participate in further negotiations for the LTTE’s proposed ‘Interim Self-Governing Authority’ in the North-East (Shinoda, 2015). Due to the absence of a political platform for discussion, both parties resume violent military offense, triggering the beginning of the most brutal section of the war, until the government’s military victory in 2009. It is not until the years following the end of the conflict that the international community admit their failures, noting that “for all the political rhetoric against engaging terrorist groups in diplomatic discussion, the reality on the ground… for this particular conflict was that was precisely what was required,” (Hulse, 2016).

Conclusion

The last section of the Sri-Lankan civil war, which claimed the lives of over 30,000 and displaced over 500,000 civilians, was arguably completely avoidable. Ultimately, the repeated failure of the main protagonists and all involved stakeholders to secure a peace agreement, should be blamed primarily on the failures of the Sri-Lankan state, as well as the failure of the extensive and damaging international involvement. The negligence from the Sri-Lankan government to control and eradicate ethnic tensions, by correcting political
and structural inequalities, could essentially have has the power to avoid the entire Sri Lankan Civil War. Failing this, the most basic principle for third party intervention in conflict resolution is ultimately to ‘do no harm’ – yet the United States, as well as other international actors, violated this massively through their support and funding for a military campaign against the LTTE (Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, 2014). Not only did this counteract the promising progress achieved through the liberal negotiation efforts of Norway and the EU, it also destroyed any existing possibility of achieving a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict. Nevertheless, Norway and the EU subsequently failed to achieve a political solution by conceding to mounting US pressure, later declaring the LTTE a ‘terrorist organisation’ and banning them from further peace negotiations. Moving forward, it is crucial that the international community question the usefulness of their intervention in conflict resolution processes, and the impartiality and neutrality that such intervention requires. In reality, the peace processes in Sri Lanka did little to transform the underlying structural obstacles which began the conflict – such as the ethnic tensions and political inequalities in the state – thus maintaining the dream of an independent Tamil homeland amongst the surviving Tamil population (International Crisis Group, 2015).

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Introduction

Intersexuality, despite having been recognised cross-culturally throughout much of history, has become increasingly scrutinised within Euro-American societies within the field of medicine over the past 300 years (Lev, 2006). Intersex bodies or, in other words, bodies with physical variations which prevent their straightforward classification as either female or male, are commonly understood as developmentally ‘incomplete’. Such bodies are systematically ‘corrected’ though early medical intervention. Although genitalia make up only a fraction of the human body, institutional discourses and societal standards surrounding their appearance and function have great implications for the lives of intersex people (King, 2015). Most babies born with intersex characteristics are surgically ‘normalised’ in an attempt to set them on culturally acceptable life trajectories: that of a male or that of a female (King, 2015). Queer theory has begun to reveal that the medical goal of discovering the ‘true’ sex of a body, and of consolidating a patient’s gender identity, is both unrealistic, politically objectionable, and ethically questionable (Morland, 2009). This essay will draw upon Queer and Feminist theory, which respectively place sexual...
differences, gender nonconformity, and power at the centre of their intellectual enquiry (Stein and Plummer, 1994). This lens will be used to critically analyse institutional discourses within the medical profession regarding the treatment of intersex conditions, exploring some of the consequences such discourses have on bodies that are elsewhere along the spectrum of human sex. The power and influence of discourses will be discussed, with particular attention being given to the pathologization of intersexuality and the consequent linguistic restrictions that are placed upon the human anatomy which render intersex bodies as unintelligible and, ultimately, invalid. A brief definition of intersexuality will be provided, after which medical discourse surrounding the treatment of intersex children will be examined. The consequences of medical practice surrounding intersexuality will be discussed, namely the impact that such practices have on intersex bodies in safeguarding their conformity, ensuring their invisibility, and reinforcing their rejection.

The ‘Third’ Sex, the Other Gender

To begin, it may first prove useful to provide a definition of ‘intersexuality’. Intersexuality describes the variations that occur in the chromosomal, gonadic, and/or anatomic expression of sex (Chau and Herring, 2002). Intersex bodies therefore can be described as bodies whose sexual development is atypical. Balocchi (2015) provides a succinct definition of these terms as referring to the “great variety of conditions in which a person can be born with a genetic and/or gonadic atypical set, or hormonal variations, and/or with a sexual anatomy that does not fit the usual characteristics and definitions of female and male” (Balocchi, 2015, pp. 67). The little-known fact that the human variety does not conform to the male/female binary is inscribed in the bodies of intersex people. Queer theory builds upon the feminist position of challenging normative assumptions of gender and identity, viewing both as socially constructed behaviours (Jagose, 1996). According to the Intersex Society of North America, there are approximately twenty different intersex traits. Due to the invisible nature of intersexuality and the secrecy that often surrounds intersex bodies, it is difficult to establish the frequency of intersex. However, it is estimated that 1 in 2,000 people are intersex (Davis, 2015). Despite the biologically occurring variations of sex that exist, and the frequency with which these variations present themselves, Western societies continue to be resistant to understanding and accepting the naturalness of human differences in sex, gender, and sexuality (Balocchi, 2015).

Throughout history there has been a notable acceptance of a third or “dual” gender, with hermaphroditism appearing in Greek mythology along with Hindu and Christian theology. Hermaphroditism was sometimes looked upon as the embodiment of sexual excess while also being portrayed as representing the twofold nature of the human being, considered by some to represent the original being (Androutsos, 2006). However, during the 19th Century, institutional discourses of medicine gained stronger influence over Western societies. This, along with the transfer of birthing to hospitals and developments in artificial hormone production and paediatric surgery, led to the quasi-systematic ‘correction’ of infants born with intersex traits into typical male/female bodies (Bastien-Charlebois, 2015). This reinforced the diffusing cultural belief that there are only two natural sexes from which the two natural genders stem. Foucault (1980) argues that modern western societies have insisted that each person has a ‘true’ sex and gender. This belief, however, is not universal. Langlo (1999) provides examples in sociological research of foreign cultures which recognise a ‘third’ gender, and have a varied understanding of the sex/gender binary. These examples include the Hijras of India, with an emphasis that they are neither women nor men, the third and fourth gender categories recognised in some Native American tribes, and finally the third sex/gender category of the Kwolu-aatmwols in Sambia, New Guinea. Research such as this, alongside keystone concepts and perspectives provided by prominent queer theorists such as Judith Butler (1990, 1993) and David Halperin (1990), has illustrated the performative nature of sex and gender, both of which can be historically and culturally defined. Following this line of thought, there are no “true” sexes or genders. Therefore, the 19th Century medical quest for the body’s “true sex” must be seen as fulfilling cultural demands as opposed to medical needs (Langlo, 1999). A possible explanation as to why there has been a medical fixation on the consolidation of a binary sex/gender system is that the two-sex cultural model has become threatened by intersex and trans-sex technologies. The consequent naturalisation of a two-gender understanding of the human body and psyche, and the discovery of an individual’s so-called “gender-bias”, has now become the focus for physicians in dealing with intersexuality (Hausmann, 1995). With these definitions and arguments in mind, the proceeding paragraphs will provide
a critical analysis of institutional discourses surrounding the medical treatment of intersexuality. This includes the surgical aesthetic intervention and hormonal therapy that is widely practiced in attempts to “normalise” the genitalia and orient the gender of intersex children towards “one of the two” types of bodies considered socially and culturally acceptable.

**The Medicalization of Intersexuality**

Further investigation into the medical treatment of intersex bodies reveals patterns of intervention to ‘correct’ intersex characteristics which oftentimes seem to be socially motivated. For those born with a visible intersex condition, this motivation can have serious implications for their life trajectories. Medical discourses surrounding intersexuality frame it as a pathology and current medical protocol involves medically unnecessary aesthetic surgeries (Bastien-Charlebois, 2015). First-person accounts of intersex adults who have undergone such surgeries during childhood testify to their painful and irreversible effects (Balocchi, 2015). The dominant medical practice since the second half of 20th Century has been to assign a sex/gender to the intersex child and to construct an “appropriate” genitalia, for the benefit of their “psycho-social health” (Balocchi, 2015). This frames the modification of infant genitalia as pre-emptive therapeutic practice (Morland, 2009) and thus disguises socio-cultural demands as medical facts. The stereotypes that define “normal” femininity and masculinity have direct impacts on the lives of intersex people. These stereotypes are associated with heterosexual discourses and result in only gender-conforming bodies being accepted as right and healthy. This has led to the pathologization of any bodies that lie outside of what is considered “normal”, therefore justifying cosmetic surgical intervention in early childhood, even in the absence of any risks to physical health (Balocchi, 2015). In such procedures, the patient is often not consulted, with parents giving consent for these procedures to be carried out on their infants and young children (Bastien-Charlebois, 2015). Medical guidelines such as those put forward by John Money (1994) recommend that in the case of an infant assigned male with a penis that is “too small” to perform vaginal penetration, or in the case of assigned female with a vagina that would prevent penetration from her “future husband”, modification should take place as soon as possible. Ideally, according to Money, this modification should take place within the first two years of life and be carried out in secrecy, to prevent the child from coming to doubt their assigned sex, gender, and sexuality. Bastien-Charlebois (2015) critiques the guidelines put forward by Money on the grounds of their (hetero)sexism and heteronormativity. Feminist and Queer analysis have exposed the manner in which traditional medical protocols such as these privilege heterosexual relationships, in particular through their assumption that marital, penis-vagina penetration, is the optimum surgical outcome (Morland, 2009). It is argued that medical discourses surrounding infant sex assignment also privilege male genitalia. For example, Money's guidelines operate under the principle “If not Adam then Eve”, with greater instances of female assignments than male (Bastien-Charlebois, 2015). This may be due to the requirements set by Money for successful feminizing surgery being more attainable than that of masculizing surgery (i.e. they must only have a small enough clitoris and a vagina that is big enough to take a penis): The vagina need not be erotically sensitive nor come up to very high visual criteria to be considered a surgical success (Langlo, 1999). In this way, the medical criteria for functioning female anatomy is held to a lower standard than that of a males, with reproductive potential and exterior appearance taking precedence over sexual pleasure (Lev, 2006). However, medical practices such as these continue to be justified in light of intersexuality being framed as a pathology, and with a continued emphasis being placed on ‘fixing’ an individual's gender identity to either male or female through early surgical intervention.

As Balocchi (2015) explains, the medical profession has labelled biological conditions of intersexuality as ‘Disturbs of Sexual Development’ (DSD). DSD terminology incorrectly suggests that intersex is a pathological condition and “implies illness, abnormality and deviance” (Balocchi, 2015, pp. 69). This pathologization invalidates the existence of intersex people and those bodies that do not conform to the rigid male/female sex binary. Consequently, the term DSD and associated medical terminology (e.g. “hyper-“, “over-“, “failure”, “syndrome”, etc.) may result in the alienation of intersex people (Balocchi, 2015). Within the context of medical discourse such as this, intersex characteristics are framed as being undesirable enough to warrant their systematic erasure from society. As a direct result of institutional discourses, intersex bodies are subjected to secrecy and pathology. Bastien-Charlebois (2015) argues that this leads to shame being associated with intersexuality and serves to further reinforce the lack of visibility that has kept the general population in the dark about the very
existence of variations of sex. The pathologization of intersexuality has led to the presence of visible intersexual characteristics being portrayed as a medical emergency, which serves to justify the performance of unnecessary aesthetic surgery on infants and children (Davis, 2015). Some authors, such as Rubin (2015) and Svobodaa (2013), have drawn attention to the ethicality of such procedures by comparing them to ritual female genital mutilation (FGM) which has been denounced internationally by human rights groups such as Amnesty International as a violation against women’s rights (see Amnesty International, 1997). Svobodaa (2013) argues that intersex genital cutting that is not medically necessary should be similarly denounced, in order to protect the genital autonomy of children. In this light, cosmetic surgeries performed on the bodies of intersex children can be framed as a human rights issue which may serve to remove the medical guise of the socio-cultural standards against which the validity of human bodies are currently being measured.

Conclusion

To conclude, this essay has provided a brief exploration into the medicalization of intersexuality and the consequences that this has had on intersex bodies. The ideologies of sex, gender, and sexuality that are at the centre of this medicalization have been discussed, with particular emphasis being given to the performativity of sex/gender and the socio-cultural context within which the pathologization of intersexuality has occurred since the 19th Century. Current medical protocol regarding the treatment of visible conditions of intersexuality at birth were analysed, including a critique of the medical terminology currently being used and the impacts that pathological language has on intersex people. It is clear that the traumas and stigmas experienced by people born with intersex conditions do not derive exclusively from paediatric surgical practices and early hormonal intervention, but rather reside within the broader medicalization process (Davis, 2015). The pathologization of the intersex body fuels a cultural refusal to recognise any and all forms of human bodies which do not comply with the strict two-sex/two-gender model. Cultural demands and social standards regarding sex are perpetuated through medical practice, the ethicality of which must be scrutinized. The experiences of people born with intersex conditions are shadowed by institutional discourses of secrecy and shame, which incorrectly frame intersexuality as an unwelcome interruption to the natural order of the human body. Such discourses have led to the genital autonomy of children being systematically threatened. Within this context of the medical ‘correction’ of intersexuality, the experiences of people born with intersex conditions are ignored and their very existence is dismissed. Thus, the role of Queer theory becomes ever more important in critically analysing discourses which have direct and indirect implications for the lives of intersex people. In ‘queering’ the social and cultural demands we place upon the human body, as well as in questioning the normativity of gender-roles and sexualities, Queer theory provides an important lens through which we can begin to accept all of the varieties of bodies and experiences which exist: Validating and valuing difference and ensuring autonomy of the body is respected as a basic human right.
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Critical Security Cinema: Revealing Securitization through the Lens of Pop Culture

Claire Windsor

Introduction

The examination of pop-culture in the field of security studies is just one of the field’s most recent forays into non-traditional areas. In this essay, I examine the shift from the traditional foundations of security studies to more critical approaches, specifically the Copenhagen School (CS) and its Theory of Securitization. Using the CS as a jumping-off-point, I then turn to the more sociologically oriented Paris School (PS) in an effort to demonstrate the limits of Barry Buzan and Wæver’s discourse-centred securitization theory when applied to pop-culture, specifically film. In particular, I will discuss the PS’ focus on the centrality of the audience and its vitality to a more complete understanding of securitization in film using the work of Theirry Balzacq and Didier Bigo. A brief foray into the writings of Laura Shepherd and Jutta Weldes on the application of security studies and other theories of International Relations to film will emphasize the usefulness of pop-culture analysis. In addition to Shepherd and Weldes, Alan Klæbel’s recent work, Imagining the Day after Tomorrow: Popular Culture, Legitimation and Environmental Securitization and its look at the “link between pop culture, cultural legitimacy and the prospects for the success of securitizing moves” will be used in my discussion of the on- and off-screen effects of securitization processes, particularly those concerning the issue of immigration (2007: 1). I will then apply the Paris School’s approach to Securitization Theory in an analysis of the securitization of immigration as seen in Alfonso Cuarón’s 2006 film Children of Men (Chaudhuri, 2012: 204). Through this case study I aim to launch a discussion of the potential (de)securitizing effects that film can have by depicting a potential outcome of existing processes of securitization and revealing them to the real-world theatre audience.

Critical Security Studies and Securitization

The field of security studies has come a long way from its fairly one-dimensional examination of the behaviour of nation-states in an attempt to develop “a scientific agenda which would work to secure the nation-state from definable threats and to preserve the status-quo” (Charette, 2009: 9). This ‘scientific agenda’ was based on the assumed rational and self-interested nature of actors in an “objectively knowable world,” hence the name ‘realism’ (Smith, 2005: 30; Krause, 1998: 303). In his writing on the shift from Traditional to Critical Security Studies, Ken Booth makes the point that “realism is a misnomer...[that] has appropriated the cloak of objectivity and practicality,” a point that was made clear in the failure of Traditional Security Studies to predict or even understand the end of the Cold War (2005: 6; Bigo, 2008: 119).

In response to the failures of the realist approach to capture an increasingly interconnected world and the security practiced within it, Keith Krause and Michael Williams launched Critical Security Studies (CSS), the aim of which is “to be theoretically inclusive in the sense of involving many different perspectives, all of which are outside the mainstream but that together do not add up to one view” (Smith, 2005: 40). By drastically expanding the potential research areas of security studies, CSS quickly became divided into a number of schools, some aligning themselves more with the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School and others applying the more recent approaches of constructivism, feminism and post-structuralism to the study of security (Wæver, 2004: 6). Around the same time as the establishment of CSS, realist approaches to security studies transitioned into the “traditional progressive” approach which attempts to make security studies more relevant to the globalized world whilst affirming two
basic premises of the existing approach. Ole Wæver describes these as “first that security is a reality prior to language...and second the more security, the better,” which gives the traditional progressive approach reason to “argue why security should encompass more than is currently the case” (1995: 46-47). One such area which security, as informed by this “traditional progressive approach,” has come to encompass is immigration which, using one of the many schools spawned by CSS, I will discuss later on in this paper. It is largely in response to this expansion of the referent objects of security that the Copenhagen School and its Theory of Securitization came about.

While some approaches took this expansion as far as post-structuralism, the Copenhagen School took a fairly middle ground approach by acknowledging the growing number of referent objects but limiting them to “five distinct yet interconnected sectors,” namely the military, environment, economic, social and political (Charette, 2009: 9). In addition to a sectoral approach to security, using a constructivist approach, Wæver sought “to put a mark on the concept [of security] itself, by entering into and through its core” (1995: 47). By considering security as both “a concept and a word,” Wæver came to see ‘security’ as “the result of a move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as above normal politics” and came to call this move “securitization” (1995: 47; 2004: 8). Unique to the CS’ Securitization Theory is the premise that “security is best understood as a discursive act, as a speech act,” making it “the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat, which demands urgent and immediate attention as well as the use of extraordinary measures to counter this threat” (Smith, 2005: 34; Buzan et al, 1998: 24-25 and Wæver, 1995: 51 quoted in Charette, 2009: 13). The intersubjective nature of Securitization means that “a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat” between a securitizing actor and an audience must occur for the Securitization process to be successful (Wæver, 2004: 8; Charette, 2009: 13).

The Paris School Approach to Securitization: Praxis over Discourse

The Paris School (PS) also examines securitization processes, but from a more sociologically oriented place, inspired by the works of Bourdieu and Foucault (Wæver, 2004: 9). While the CS’ concept of securitization is based on speech act theory in which “utterances realize a specific action,” meaning that to say security is in essence to do security, the PS approach argues:

“...that securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) process that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction” (Balzacq, 2010: 1-2).

By considering not just the discourse involved in securitization, I argue that the PS approach is more realistic in its understanding that “a practice can be oriented toward a goal without being consciously informed by it” (Balzac, 2010: 2). Even prominent CS theorist, Ole acknowledges that the PS approach’s prioritization of praxis over discourse is advantageous in that this allows it “to keep up with a society increasingly characterized by professionalization and technical rationalization” (2004: 9-10). In regards to the securitization of immigration, the consideration of routine practices by established fields of professionals is vital as it underscores the degree to which long-standing practices concerning the management of the movement of persons has become normalized. This normalization of certain practices, such as the requirement of government issued identification to access services, demonstrates that the CS’ idea that security only occurs through the use of extraordinary measures legitimated by a speech act ignores that what a society considers to be “extraordinary” is dependent on their socially constructed idea of what is “ordinary”.

This brings us to the first of the Paris School’s three major assumptions as set out by Thierry Balzacq’s A theory of securitization: origins, core assumptions and variants, that of the centrality of the audience. While the Copenhagen School acknowledges the importance of an audience’s acceptance of a securitizing move to its success, it provides no illustration of who the audience might consist of, how they are presented this securitizing move or how they would go about accepting it (Leonard & Kaunert, 2010: 58). In contrast, the PS offers a conceptualization of the audience that allows for a more systematic analysis by specifying that an “empowering audience” which “a) has a direct causal connection with the issue; and b) has the ability to enable the securitizing actor to adopt measures in order to tackle the threat” (Balzacq, 2010: 9).
The second of the PS’ assumptions is the co-dependency of agency and context, essentially an examination of how language constructs our perceptions of “how external contexts...affect securitization” (Balzacq, 2010: 12-13). This directly related to an audience's potential acceptance of securitizing moves as the success of a securitizing move, “rests with whether the historical conjecture renders [the] audience more sensitive to its vulnerability” (Balzacq, 2010: 13). For example, empowering audiences were far more likely to accept the securitization of air plane travel in the post-9/11 context since the words of the securitizing actors were able to connect the use of body scanners and pat-downs to a tragic event that resonated with people around the world. In other words, the cultural meaning ascribed to the potential dangers of air travel was altered on 9/11, changing audience's perception of and potential acceptance of securitizing practices.

This brings us to the third and final assumption of the PS, the dispositif and the structuring force of practices. Balzacq contends that “manifestations of securitization might best be understood by focusing on the nature and functions of policy tools used by agents/agencies to cope with public problems, defined as threats” (2010: 15). He goes on to discuss two types of tools, the first being “regulatory instruments” which “aim to influence the behaviours of social actors by permitting certain practices to reduce the threat...[or] by promoting certain perceptions of threat” which in the case of immigration this could refer to the connection between migration and terrorism that is often used by governments as an excuse to close borders (Balzacq, 2010: 17). The second type of tools are “capacity tools” which operate within the framework of “regulatory instruments” and are encouraged to evolve alongside technology so they might better “attend to the transformations of what is perceived as a precarious environment” (Balzacq, 2010: 17). For example, while in the past the basic information contained in one's passport was all considered enough for a person to cross national borders, in recent years the collection of one's biometric information upon entry into a country has been presented as essential to maintaining internal security. In fact, some theorists have expanded upon the above ideas, particularly in reference to the post-9/11 world, attempting to show how “the professionals of politics play with the uncertainty of the timing of the attacks,” and the unpredictability of the enemy “in order to establish a 'permanent state of exception'...thus justifying the introduction of tough measures in many realms beyond the management of political violence and especially with relation to asylum-seekers and migrants” (Agamben, cited in Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 3).

Security by (In)security

To conclude our discussion of the Paris School's approach to securitization processes, we must explore its conception of (in)securitization processes. In an attempt to “maintain something as an essence of 'international' security in order to save the IR discipline from a possible invasion by the other disciplines,” the Copenhagen School considers security to be about survival and survival to be about existential threat (Bigo, 2008: 122). Instead, the PS approach argues that this disciplinary limitation serves as a barrier to the full understanding of processes of security and by drawing from sociology, expands the survival-based concerns of CS to the “management of life and its social and structural conditions” thus also using security to describe “a range of practices which...may be summarized by a mainstream position so as to protect and reassure in order to stay alive, and if possible to have a good life” (Bigo, 2008: 123). The central assumption behind this point is that security is a zero-sum game which relies on the practices mentioned above as “a peculiar method through which a dominant group justifies and imposes a political program by assessing who needs to be protected and who can be sacrificed, who can be designated as an object of fear, control, coercion” (Balzacq, Basaran, Bigo, Guittet & Olsson, 2010, para.5). Thus, security can only occur as a result of processes of insecuritization and the definition of what separates security from insecurity is a political struggle taking place within the field of professionals (Bigo, 2008: 123).

One of the implications of the PS’ conception of insecurity is the dismantling of the internal/external threat binary upheld by the CS. In other words, the CS views an existential threat as “the new boundary between the internal and the everyday politics on one side, and the international and the exceptional politics also called security on the other,” thus the PS’ acknowledgement of the constructed nature of (in)security by a transnational field of professionals, “blurs the boundaries between the domestic external fields of security” (Bigo, 2008: 122; Balzacq, Basaran, Bigo, Guittet & Olsson, 2010, para.11, 19). The blurring of these lines has become more prominent than ever in the post-9/11 context, a clear example of which was the 2002 establishment
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) whose self-proclaimed mission is:

“...to secure the nation from the many threats we face. This requires the dedication of more than 240,000 employees in jobs that range from aviation and border security to emergency response, from cybersecurity analyst to chemical facility inspector. Our duties are wide-ranging, but our goal is clear - keeping America safe “ (Dhs.gov/about-dhs, 2014).

The “wide-ranging” duties of the DHS extend from “coordinated responses to terrorist attacks, natural disasters or other large emergencies” to “facilitating legal immigration and enforcing laws,” a mandate which explicitly relies on an obscuring of “the boundaries...between the protection of public order, defense of the democratic order, and the state of war” (Dhs.gov/mission, 2014; Balzacq, Basaran, Bigo, Guittet & Olsson, 2010, para.19).

Pop Culture and Audience: Reflecting the Present in the Future

Before I move on to my Paris School-based analysis of the film Children of Men, I will use this next section to outline the importance of pop-culture to the audience's reception of real world processes of securitization. Inspired by Roland Bleiker’s work on the ‘aesthetic turn’ in International Relations, in particular, “that the dissolution of boundaries between ‘factual’ knowledge and ‘fictive’ representations challenges the truth status of all disciplinary knowledge,” the work of Jutta Weldes, Laura Shepherd and Alan Klæbel explores the importance of pop-cultural representations of current and future extensions of world politics (Bleiker, 2001, cited in Shepherd, 2013:10). In reading their works, I will specifically explore how these representations work to inform the perceptions of potential audiences to securitizing processes.

As noted earlier in this essay, securitization is “a sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development...is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it,” and based on the increasingly important role pop-culture plays in informing what audiences ‘know about the world,’ an exploration of these interactions is vital to better understanding processes of securitization (Léonard & Kaunert, 2010:61). Pop-culture is a representative manifestation of “the context within which people give meaning to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives,” and is created through specific (re)productions of existing discourse and norms (Hall, 1997, cited in Weldes, 2003:6). One of the things that makes pop-cultural representations so unique is their ability to traverse time and in doing so, take the current political context and extrapolate it in a way that can reveal them to audiences in a new light.

Depending on the perspective of the creator, the effects of these representations can “[help] to produce consent to foreign policy and state action” as is the case in Alan Klæbel's exploration of environmental securitization in the film The Day After Tomorrow, which “builds explicitly on certain theories of the causes and consequences of climate change” (Weldes, 2003: 7; Klæbel, 2009: 19). While The Day After Tomorrow does not offer specific policy responses to climate change, by presenting environmental discourse alongside the human-centred “reconciliation story between an absent father and his estranged son,” it makes it easier for audiences to “accept these discourses as a basis for accepting the political and economic costs of a securitization” (Klæbel, 2009: 19-20). Of course, the opposite can be true as Weldes notes that “while prevailing cultural and discursive practices constrain and oppress people, they simultaneously provide...[a space] to challenge the boundaries of common sense, to contest the taken-for-granted” (2003: 6-7). As will be demonstrated below, I argue that this is exactly what Cuarón's Children of Men does in its extrapolation of the practices and processes that drive the current securitization of immigration.

Weldes’ work looks specifically at the science fiction genre and what it tells us about the present, as does Klæbel in his discussion of the link between time and security, exploring how “questions of security are intimately related to future possibilities” (Weldes, 2003: 11; Klæbel, 2009: 4-5). Thus, by setting Children of Men in the year 2027, Cuarón presents the audience with the potential aftermath of today’s securitization of immigration and, since the future does not yet exist, “it follows that future possibilities remain contingent and carry no necessities” (Children of Men, 2006; Klæbel, 2009: 7). Interestingly, Klæbel asserts that security discourses are also a kind of science fiction as “they involve a storyline of future existence that relies heavily on science [and rationalist thought] in both
its presentation and solution” (2009: 11).

The Paris School’s approach to securitization complements one of Moore and Farrands’ arguments on the usefulness of visual analysis in Security Studies in particular the assertion that “through an understanding of text we come to make sense of the way in which social behaviour and social meanings are constituted and how they are used in relation to power and institutions” (2013: 233). The “[re-presentation of] alternative configurations of identity, community and authority” in films such as Children of Men when combined with “the details of scientific advancement or transformation” presents an ideal case study for the application of the PS’ thoughts, detailed above, on the centrality of the audience, co-dependency of agency and context and structuring force of the dispositif (Shepherd, 2013: 89).

The Securitization of Immigration in Alfonso Cuarón’s Children of Men

The 2006 film Children of Men tells the story of Theo Faron, a cynical Ministry of Energy bureaucrat living in London, England in the midst of a global infertility crisis whose former activist loyalties are stirred up when his former partner and pro-immigrant activist Julian employs his help in transporting a young, miraculously pregnant girl named Kee out of the country. While the infertility crisis is undoubtedly the biggest threat to this world, there is markedly little securitization of women’s fertility, apart from the occasional billboard reminding the population that “missing fertility checks is a crime” (Children of Men, 2006). Instead, the British government seems to have given up on the fertility issue, and turned their sights towards something they can control, immigration. One can see how a sudden influx of migrants could be problematic in a situation where resources are becoming scarce, however the full-scale securitization of immigration portrayed in Alfonso Cuarón’s imagining of the future is formidable.

In the context of Children of Men, I consider the securitizing actor to be the U.K. government and more specifically, the Deportation and Exile Department (DED) whose logo is attached to most anti-immigrant propaganda along with the reminder that they are “working for the British people,” a definite echo of the previously discussed American Department of Homeland Security and its purported aims (Children of Men, 2006). As subjects of the government and its policies, British citizens make up the audience, or at least they did. It is unclear in the film whether the government remains democratic or in any way beholden to the British citizenry. However, the guarded perimeter separating the masses from St. James’ park and Buckingham Palace as well as the use of the royal seal to distinguish between spaces representative of “civilization and barbarity” suggests otherwise (Children of Men, 2006; Chaudhuri, 2012: 195). As the first tenet of the Paris School’s approach to securitization is that of the centrality of the audience in determining whether a securitizing move will be successful or not, this implies that the audience’s acceptance of the securitization of immigration occurred some time ago, and as the film is set only 22 years in the future, it may lead the audience to question whether this acceptance is already happening in the present (Balzacq, 2010: 3).

The post-9/11 political climate in which the film was created is clearly reflected in the film’s depiction of securitized immigration, particularly the scene where Theo and Kee pass through a security corridor on their way to Bexhill Refugee Camp and witness a procession of detainees with bags over their heads, being forcibly stripped and eventually their corpses laid out, half covered on the ground, images which are eerily reminiscent of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib (Children of Men, 2006). In addition, Cuarón’s personal experience as a Mexican national who “has a talent for crossing borders and worked temporarily in the USA a few times before settling...with his family” may have influenced the images of so-called ‘fugees’ (refugees) packed into buses on their way to being deported, a common sight for Americans living near the U.S.-Mexico border (Goren, 2006). Again, in accordance with the PS’ emphasis of the co-dependency of context and agency, these images force the audience to confront existing security practices and question their own agency within the context of the ‘War on Terror’. In fact, by taking today’s processes of securitization and placing them in a different, future, context, the film reveals the “state of exception” created by the ‘War on Terror’ and used to bolster support for the securitization of immigration by connecting it with Terrorism (Agamben cited in Chaudhuri, 2012: 194).

In regards to the final tenet of the PS’ approach to securitization, the
dispositif and the structuring force of practices, Children of Men provides examples of how both regulatory instruments and capacity tools are used to further the securitization of immigration. Particularly significant are the state-sponsored propaganda videos played on a loop in city buses which apart from the video monitors, would not be out of place in today's London. The first of these videos shows a barrage of images of bombings, screaming, disease, and fires with the superimposed with names of the world's largest cities which immediately cuts to a waving Union Jack, patriotic music and the phrase “only Britain soldiers on” (Children of Men, 2006). The second video flips through images of a number of people while various British voices state, “He's my dentist. She's my house cleaner. He's the waiter, she's my cousin” followed by a proclamation by the narrator that “They are illegal immigrants. To hire, feed or shelter immigrants is a crime” (Children of Men, 2006). When played one after another as they are on the buses, these videos force a connection between migration, crime and societal collapse which excuses the capacity tools like checkpoints and the mass imprisonment and deportation of immigrants.

**Conclusion**

While this has been just a brief look at the securitization of immigration in Alfonso Cuarón’s Children of Men, by using three assumptions that underpin the Paris School's approach to securitization theory, I hope to have demonstrated the value that a pop-cultural analysis can have in relation to current political affairs and policies. As discussed in relation to the works of Jutta Weldes, Laura Shepherd and Alan Klæbel, the ability of pop-culture to inform an audience's perception of the world can have an effect on the likelihood of them accepting and making successful, securitizing moves. Therefore, I argue that, by confronting theatre audiences with a dramatized world in which their acceptance of certain discourses today has manifested itself into a dystopian future with almost no regard for human life, Children of Men may actually have a de-securitizing effect on immigration, opening up space for an examination of the insecurity these security processes produce.

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Matthew Collins

Introduction

Since the eighteenth century, biopower has emerged as the fundamental power of the state, according to Foucault (1990). Biopower is the regulation of individuals (anatomo-politics) and whole populations (biopolitics), resulting in the power of the state to foster life, or to disallow it. Biopower in Iran has undergone three main shifts in its exercise since 1966.

Firstly after the 1966 census, during the reign of Mohamed Reza Shah, biopower aimed at population reduction in order to foster life. In 1979, a popular revolution resulted in the overthrow of the Imperial Pahlavi government, and its eventual replacement with a theocratic regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini. War broke out, almost immediately between newly theocratic Iran and Ba'athist Iraq. This marks the second shift; population reduction was deemphasized, and biopower operated to achieve population growth. Finally, following the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1980 - 1988), biopower once more sought the reduction of population growth.

This paper’s arguments are threefold. Firstly, the shifts in the objectives of biopower are explained by changes in truth discourses understood and expressed by diverse authorities. Secondly, I argue that variation in the success of these biopolitical projects was determined by the extent to which technologies of power, as related to the truth discourses of authorities conflicted with, or alternatively coalesced with, and produced local knowledges. Thirdly, and in conclusion, I argue that the progression of raison d’état (rational knowledge which “allows the state to be maintained” (Foucault, 2004, p. 288)), from the “system of police” to the system of political economy, is more complex than originally suggested by Foucault (2004).

This essay will firstly elucidate key concepts related to biopower and the raison d’état, using the work of Foucault (1980; 1990; 2004) and Rabinow et al. (2006). Thereafter, it will consider each of the three periods chronologically, discussing the respective truth discourses, technologies of power and relative success of each project. I will then conclude that biopower was most successfully exercised when it produced or coalesced with local Islamic and economic knowledges.

The Concept of Biopower

Biopower, according to Foucault (1990), is the power of the state to generate, optimize and order life. It places biological life into the realm of calculation, such that it may be controlled. This occurs through various techniques by which individual bodies are disciplined (anatomo-politics), and whole populations are regulated (biopolitics) to maximize the strength of the state (Foucault, 2010).

Foucault (1980) argues that all forms of power require the production of discourses of truth. A discourse of truth is the practice that constitutes what an individual accepts as reality, and in turn causes an individual to act in a certain way and speak this truth discourse themselves.

Foucault speaks of an economy of truth discourses. In this regard, we can understand there to be multiple truth discourses in operation, from those...
constructed by political elites, to those used by ordinary people. Rabinow et al. (2006) relate truth discourses to biopower, by elucidating that biopower requires a truth discourse about the vital characteristics of a population, spoken by competent authorities. As such, biopower requires that the authorities believe and speak about a biological, sociological or demographic need of the population.

Technologies of power describe how the populations and individual bodies are regulated in biopolitical projects (Foucault, 1990). According to Rabinow et al. (2006), these technologies of power are often modes of subjectification (the process by which the self is produced), whereby individuals discipline themselves in light of particular truth discourses communicated by state authority. Importantly, Foucault (1990), notes how local knowledges, or truth discourses, may be oppositional to centralized and hierarchized truth discourses, such as those of the state.

As such, in deconstructing biopower in Iran, it is necessary to comprehend the truth discourses spoken by state authorities that construct the objectives of biopower; how these truth discourses relate to technologies of power, and how truth discourses as technologies of power may conflict with local knowledges, thus preventing the effective exercise of biopower.

**Biopower in the regime of Mohammed Reza Shah, 1966 - 1979**

The truth discourse spoken by the Imperial regime was one that emphasized the necessity of modernization to propel Iran into the ranks of prosperous countries. This discourse emphasized the need to Westernize Iran for it to return to a “Great Civilization”. This desire saw population growth reduction as a vital need of the populace to ensure modernization (Paidar, 1995). As such, biopower was enacted by the state to ensure population growth control (Adams et al., 2012). As espoused by state discourse, the continued growth of the population prevented improvement of state services such as education and healthcare. (Moore et al., 1974).

This truth discourse influenced how biopower was exercised. The primary method of control utilized by the Imperial regime was a media campaign that emphasized the adverse effect of rapid population growth on the national economy (Adams et al., 2012). This prevented Iran from becoming a Westernized, modern nation (Paidar, 1995). The technology of power in operation here can be termed “responsibilization”, whereby the state truth discourse seeks to “responsibilize” Iranian individuals and their families for the general well-being of the nation-state, and in turn cause them to discipline themselves because of this responsibility (Lemke, 2002). In this regard, the media campaign attempted to responsibilize all Iranians for the modernization of the nation, and thus encourage them to regulate their own sexualities.

The production of this truth discourse failed to replace local knowledges that shaped the procreative decisions of Iranian women and families. Firstly, it became situated in a local political truth discourse which constructed the Shah's regime as a tool of Western imperialism, capitalist domination, and militant secularism. The Shah's regime was heavily associated with Western governments, particularly the United States due to a large quantity of trade deals and political agreements, as well as increased amounts of American commodities and technical workers entering Iran during the reign of the Shah (Keddie et al., 2003). Moreover, the family planning policy itself was heavily supported by the United States Agency for International Development. This discourse was perpetuated by numerous religious leaders (Hoodfar et al., 2000), who preached at Friday sermons that population control was an imperialist plot to subjugate Muslim countries by limiting their population sizes (Adams et al., 2012).

Secondly, the “responsibilization” strategy ran contrary to powerful local Islamic truth discourses on procreation. Momeni (1972) writes that belief in the appropriateness of early marriage (and thus early, and subsequently more frequent conception) was universalized in Shi’ite religious teaching at the time in Iran. Early marriage has been identified as the most important cause of high fertility (Van de Walle, 1973). In addition, bearing a family was regularly emphasized within Islamic discourses in Iran as an important function of women (Fathi, 1985). Additionally, with the onset of the family planning program, this preference for large families was often heightened into a rejection of family planning and contraception, with some ulema preaching at sermons that family
planning was haram (forbidden) (Adams et al., 2012).

Thirdly, this truth discourse appealed to a national economic rationality that contradicted the individual economic rationality of Iranian women. Women could easily be divorced if they failed to produce a son (Mehryar et al., 2000), leaving them without any economic support. Infant mortality was also high, hovering between 14 - 16% between in the 1970s (Khosravi, 2007), which created an incentive to have many children. As such, a discourse which emphasized limiting family size to modernize and enrich the state contradicted the internalized rationality of most Iranian women, which made regular procreation a logical choice.

Evidently, the technology of power of “responsibilization,” stemming from a truth discourse which emphasized one’s obligation to national modernization and enrichment, contradicted the local, political, Islamic and economic discourses in which procreation was situated. The Imperial regime made no attempt to overcome this contradiction. Indeed, as Mehryar (2000) outlines, no fatwa (official ruling) was ever sought by the Family Planning Program from the ulema (Muslim jurists) of the country to try to inculcate the biopolitical discourse within the knowledges that opposed it. As such, most Iranians continued to discipline the self-base on local truth discourses as opposed to the national, biopolitical truth discourse.

As such, the first decade of the program witnessed only a minor decline in population growth from 3.1% to 2.9% (Isfandiyari, 1997). Importantly, there is evidence that a decline in the population growth had already begun in 1959, and there is no evidence that the Family Planning Program had any effect on the continuation or acceleration of this decline (Raftery et al., 1995)

Biopower in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979 - 1989

In 1979, the Imperial government was overthrown. Eventually, a theocratic constitution was approved with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini becoming Supreme Leader of Iran (Amuzegar, 1991). The truth discourse which constructed the object of biopower during this period was one which emphasized the importance of a strong Islamic state and large population of Muslims (Mahmoodi et al., 2014). This led biopower to aim to increase population growth.

Four sub-discourses constructed this truth discourse. Firstly, as noted by Roudi-Fahimi (2002), an anti-Western, anti-imperialist discourse (as articulated above) was crucial, in that it emphasized the need to grow the population to prevent Western domination. Secondly, academic and technocratic discourses of formerly exiled Iranian intellectuals who entered the Islamic government centred on the belief that development, driven by a large population, would eventually lead to a self-regulation of population growth (Mehryar, 2000). Thirdly, religious discourses construed a large population as divinely ordained (Mahmoodi et al, 2014), and communicated the need for an Islamic generation (Adams et al. 2012). A fourth discourse emerged following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, which emphasized the benefit of a large population during the war to replace fallen soldiers. Khomeini spoke of a “Twenty Million Man Army” in Iran which could be used to defeat the foreign enemy (Abbasi et al., 2002).

All four of these sub-discourses contributed to the motivating truth discourse that governed biopower: that the government should aim for population growth so that they could foster a strong, Islamic nation. This, in turn, defined the technologies of power from that period.

The truth discourse spoken by state authorities was expressed in religious terms and, as such, esteem in religious terms operated as a key technology of power. Cruikshank (1996) argues that esteem operates as a technology of power when citizens are rendered subject to certain goals, which their fulfillment or lack thereof construct their self-esteem, leading them to regulate the self so that they can meet that goal. The Islamic government presented motherhood as a crucial channel through which women could gain status (Azari, 1983), thus linking the esteem of women to their procreative choices.
Responsibilization also operated here, but was different from the responsibilization of the Imperial regime in that it operated in Islamic terms. Individuals were encouraged to regulate the self for the Islamic Republic by emphasizing the importance of building a “Twenty Million Man Army”, to protect the Islamic nation-state. This phrase became a national slogan (Abbasi et al., 2002).

Effort was also exerted to align pronatalist biopower with the local economic discourses which shaped the decisions of Iranian families. A rationing system that increased access to consumer goods for each additional child was introduced (Adams et al. 2012). In this regard, biopower that attempted to increase the population size was intended to mesh with local economic discourses which centered around the needs of individual families, by placing increased procreation inside a discourse of what was economically rational for individual families.

These technologies of power appear to have been relatively successful in increasing population growth. The decline in population growth that had occurred since 1959 was reversed (Kashani-Sabet, 2011). Average population growth between 1979 - 1986, population was 3.9% (Yaghmai, n.d.), however, this period also saw the increased use of contraception, contrary to the state propagated discourses which encouraged procreation. Contraceptive use among married women aged 15 - 49 rose from 37% in 1976 to 50% in 1979 (Abbasi et al., 2002).

This increased contraceptive use occurred due to the emergence of a new truth discourse on rational economic planning of the family. As noted by Abbasi et al. (2002), the war years placed increased economic hardship on Iranian families, such as increased inflation and pay-freezes, which lead to a decision to limit family size. In turn, fertility began to drop, with a decline in population growth from a high in 1986 of 3.4% to 2.7% in 1992 (Hoodfar, 1996).

This data suggests that the regime promoted religious truth discourses through esteem and responsibilization, which aligned with local Islamic knowledges, leading to the successful exercise of biopower and a reduction in population growth. However, it appears that economic rationality shifted during the war, and eventually contradicted the religious truth discourse of the regime. The data suggests that local economic rationality which advocated for a limited family size was a stronger truth discourse for Iranians than religious discourse, both state and local, which constructed procreation as a method for achieving personal esteem and fulfilling societal religious obligation. Moreover, the ration system was not sufficient to render procreation an economically rational choice. As such, although biopower was more successfully exercised than in the modernization drive of the Shah, it was still limited to a certain extent by conflicting state and local knowledges.

**Biopower after the Iran-Iraq war**

Despite initial satisfaction with the results of the 1986 census that indicated rapid population growth, the government of Iran began promoting family planning once more in 1989/90 (Isfandiyari, 1997). The shift in this truth discourse regarding the vital needs of the population can is explicated by Hoodfar et al. (2000), who documents the rise of population control advocates within the regime, led by a coalition of the Plan and Budget Organization, Ministry of Health and Education, and political leaders. The success of this group in lobbying the government led state authorities to become concerned once more with the limitation of population growth, due to the economic damage such growth would cause the nation.

Mahmoodi et al. (2014) describe this truth discourse as “Islamic realism”. This truth discourse articulated that the state should foster a strong, Muslim state through reducing the rate of population growth. In 1988, Ayatollah Khamenei articulated the need for discussion on population control (Moinifar, 2007), while before his death in 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini endorsed the population control program which emerged following the Mashhad Conference. This policy reversal was justified in Islamic terms and was a qualified intervention. Reduction in population growth was justified by a socioeconomic crisis, declared by the religious establishment (Hoodfar et al., 2000). Following government approval, condoms and contraceptive pills were distributed free of charge (Kashani-Sabet, 2011). Vasectomies and tubectomies were eventually provided for those over
the age of thirty or those who had three children or more (Hoodfar et al, 2000).

This truth discourse was once more fundamentally religious, and as such, religion played a key role in the technologies of power, which aimed to discipline the population. Religious leaders began promoting the moral imperatives of birth control in sermons which were broadcast on radio and television (Isfandiyari, 1997). Debates among medieval Islamic jurists on the importance of population control were researched and republished (Adams et al., 2012). Fatwas were declaring to rural health houses the legitimacy of practicing contraception (Moinifar, 2007). A conference of ulema gathered to discuss the permissibility of contraception was organized in Isfahan in Iran in 1990 (Moinifar, 2007), where consensus was reached that birth control was acceptable (Hoodfar et al., 2000).

As in the two previous regimes, “responsibilization” was a crucial technology of power. Attempts were made to ensure Iranians understood themselves to be responsible for the regulation of the population. In health houses, covering 95% of the population, statistics such as the number of children born each month, number of married women of reproductive age, and the prevalence of different contraceptives was displayed prominently. Health care workers emphasized that women must regulate their own reproduction (Roudi-Fahimi, 2002). The negative effects of population growth were published regularly in newspapers (Mahmoodi et al., 2014) at the behest of the state (Hoodfar et al., 2000). All university students were required to take a course in family planning and the effects of population growth (Mahmoodi et al, 2014). Evidently, there was a multifaceted attempt to inculcate a sense of responsibility in young Iranians to discipline their sexual practices.

Crucially, because this responsibilization occurred with religious justification form the ulema, and was adopted under a religious truth regime, it reshaped local knowledges of the religious permissibility of population control, rather than contradicting them. Additionally, it did not conflict with local rational economic knowledges. Infant mortality had declined to 4% from 6% (Khosravi, 2007), reducing the impetus for increased procreation. Moreover, a biopower which encouraged families to have fewer children for the benefit of the Iranian Islamic nation-state gelled with the individual rational economic discourse of the time, which saw large families as irrational due to the increased financial burden with which they were associated.

As such, because technologies of power either altered or aligned with local religious and economic knowledges, biopower effectively regulated the population and reduced population growth. Between 1986 and 1996, the population growth rate declined from 3.9% to 2% (Simbar, 2012). While the general trend of population growth since 1956 has been negative, the largest decline in population occurred between 1986 - 1996 following the introduction of the family planning program, pointing to the effectiveness of the technologies of power in operation. This data confirms the success of biopower which does not challenge local knowledges, but rather reshapes or aligns with them.

Conclusion

The literature and data presented above formulates a strong argument to understand the shifts in biopolitical projects between 1966 - 1996 as the result of shifting truth discourses. In each period, the objectives of biopower were motivated by differing discourses as to the vital need of the population. This shifted from a discourse which emphasized the need to modernize and thus reduce population growth, to emphasis on the need to foster a strong Islamic state, which was understood to be achieved firstly through population growth, and eventually through population control.

In each period, these truth discourses informed the technologies of power operating to achieve biopower. Evidently, biopower was most successfully exercised between 1989 - 1996. The truth discourse which was espoused by religious authorities, and which formed the basis of biopolitical motivations, saw the vital need of Iranian society to be the longevity of an Islamic state, which could only be achieved through controlling population growth. This informed the technologies of power. The practice of family planning became linked to one's religious obligation to fellow Iranian Muslims.

This reformulated local religious knowledges which had previously seen procreation as a religious duty, to now consider the practice of contraception as
part of their religious calling. Moreover, the dominant local economic knowledge at the time was one of rational individualism where declining infant mortality, along with rising living costs, removed the need for large families. This local economic knowledge was not contested by a biopower which sought to limit the practice of procreation.

This success is contrasted by biopower between 1966 - 1979, and 1979 - 1989. The modernizing truth discourses of biopower under the Imperial regime conflicted with local political, religious and economic discourses. Biopower during the Iran-Iraq war aligned itself with religious discourses, but failed to effectively constitute procreation as part of a rational economic discourse through a program which tied rations to family size.

In conclusion, the case of Iran highlights that truth discourses both motivate biopower and determine its efficacy due to the relation of motivating truth discourses to the technologies of power which will come to be exercised. Thus, the success of biopower is determined by the extent to which truth discourses which motivate and constitute technologies of biopower, conflict with, align with, or produce local truth discourses.

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The Return of Religion as a Factor of International Relations: The Causes of the Failure of the Secularisation Theory

Nicolas Yahyaoui

Introduction

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia is commonly considered as the starting point of the secularisation of the Western World. The Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, more commonly referred to as the Treaties of Westphalia, brought an end to the Thirty Years' War, one of the most violent wars in pre-modern history, and led to the emergence of a new order between European Nations, based on the principles of “territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures” (Krasner, 1990: 20). Moreover, while religion was still a central part of the European politics before that date (Hurd, 2008: 3), the Treaties of Westphalia, by stating that “those of the confessions of Ausburg who are subjects of the Catholics and the Catholics subjects of the Lutheran estates [...] shall be patiently tolerated, and shall not be prohibited to attend privately with liberty of conscience their services in their house [...] and even to assist [...] at the public exercise of their religion [...]”, consecrated the privatisation of religion. By privatizing religion, the “Westphalian presumption” therefore led to the idea that “religion is thus peripheral, and [that] reflection on international politics is pursued as if it concerned an autonomous space that is not fundamentally disturbed by its presence” (Carlson and Owens, 2003: 14).

Secularisation, defined as the removal of social and cultural fields from the “domination of religious institutions and symbols” (Berger, 1973: 113), slowly imposed itself, and led the majority of the scientific world to rallying behind Nietzsche's famous quote, “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him” (Nietzsche, 1882: 120). Religion, seen as a domain separated from the political decision making, both at the national and international levels, was therefore widely ignored by international relations theories that were developed after 1648, which strongly relied on the Westphalian presumption (Hurd, 2008:3), focusing on material factors rather than non-material ones (Sandal and James, 2008: 3). However, the predictions that religion was condemned to fade away because of its strict separation from the public sphere appear to be contradicted by the facts. While 50 percent of the world population adhered to either Catholic or Protestant Christianity, Islam or Hinduism in 1900, around 64 percent did in 2000 (Tofft, Philpott and Shah, 2011; 2). Peter Berger even admitted he had been wrong in predicting the universalisation of secularism, stating that “the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false [and that] the world today is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever” (Berger, 1999; 2). On the international scene, the 9/11 attacks and the emergence of Al Qaeda as a transnational threat to Western States forced them to consider religion as a “central factor in relations within, and especially among, [each other]” (Desch, 2013; 14). The same way they had been unable to predict the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the shift towards a unipolar – or multipolar – international system, international relations theories failed to predict the resurgence of religion as a factor affecting global politics. These theories therefore face a challenge “comparable to that of the end of the Cold War or the emergence of globalisation” (Hatzoupoulos and Petito, 2003; 3), and their ability to overcome it in order to integrate religion within their scope of analysis will be one of the burning topics on their agenda in the coming years.

What role did secularism as it emerged after 1648 play in the incapacity of international relations theories to forecast the return of religion in the international scene? We will try to show that the understanding of the concept of secularisation that Western international relations theorists took for granted...
was not historically accurate, which allowed a modern form of religion to impose itself as a factor of international relations. Because religion in Early-modern Europe was a social rather than spiritual phenomenon (I), the two distinct types of secularism that later emerged never actually operated a total exclusion of religion from the public sphere (II), which in our view explains why religion was able to come back as a factor of international relations without international relations theorists predicting it.

Secularism as it emerged: the socio-historical roots of the Treaties of Westphalia

The Thirty Years’ War is often considered as a war of religions. However, the fact that Catholic France fought on the “Protestant side”, alongside Sweden, the Dutch United Provinces, and some German Protestant States, shows that it was as much “a struggle over dynastic and nationalist ambitions as it was a fight over religious […] principles” (Hills, 2006: 781). Still, using a modern definition of religion to explain the causes and consequences of the Thirty Years’ War has been quite common in the past (Thomas, 2005; 23), and has distorted our understanding of secularism as it emerged in 1648. We will show that the concept of religion that was targeted by the Treaties of Westphalia actually was defined as a “community of believers” rather than a “body of beliefs”, and that Westphalian secularism therefore was meant to operate a “restructuring” of religion rather than to trigger its inevitable disappearing.

Religion in early modern Europe: a “community of believers” rather than a “body of beliefs”

It is usually explained that it is the “split in the Christian Church and the wars that followed” (Cooper, 2004; 21) that caused the shift of social power from the Church to the State. Indeed, the historiography of religion in early modern Europe was, in its first stage, mainly a confessional historiography, centred on what is commonly referred to as the “confessionalization theory” (Reinhard, 1981). Its main paradigm was that religion, and more specifically the religious divisions that appeared within the Catholic Church during the 15th century, affected “not only the area of religion and church, but the entire social and political system” (Lotz-Heumann, 2001; 96). From that standpoint, the Thirty Years’ War was a merely ideological confrontation. As a consequence, the Treaties of Westphalia were therefore believed to have been signed in order to reduce the influence of religion over people’s lives altogether, precisely because religion, as a set of beliefs, was thought to be the central element explaining social issues.

However, while that approach was still hegemonic at the end of the 1970s, it was later strongly criticized, on several grounds. First, W. Schulze claimed that, even at the end of the 16th century and at the beginning of the 17th century, there existed social actors and processes that were not impacted by the religious events that are described as central by the confessionalization theory. Doing so, he denied religion its centrality on the events of the 17th century and, stressing his point, even claimed that the secularisation process had already begun even when the Thirty Years’ War started (Schulze, 1987; 51). The other main point of criticism of the confessionalization theory concerns its claim that the processes it puts in motion are mainly “top-to-bottom”; and that the importance of religion in that period was due to a form of pressure imposed by the early modern State or clerical authorities on citizens. Rather, R. Schmidt believes that confessionalization was first and foremost a “communal process” (Schmidt, 1997). Religion therefore had specific social functions, and confessionalization took place because it “fitted in with their [communities’] particular interests [and] because there was a need for regulation within society” (Lotz Heumann, 2001; 110). It therefore appears that religion in early-modern Europe was a social phenomenon rather than a spiritual one, and it should be regarded as a “community of believers” rather than a “body of beliefs” (Thomas, 2005; 24). In other words, it can be said that early-modern European society “was structured through a double dualist system of classification” (Casanova, 1994; 15). The first dualism separated “this world” from “the other world”, and “this world” was itself separated between a religious and secular sphere. What the Westphalia Treaty, by privatising religion, wanted to bring an end to, was the dualism described by Casanova within “this world”, by lowering the social regulatory power of religion, in order for that regulatory power to be transmitted to the State.

1648 marked the end of religion as a structuring factor of the social life, and the goal of the Westphalia Treaties was the “passage, transfer or relocation of persons, things, function, meanings […] from their traditional locations in
the religious sphere to the secular sphere” (Casanova, 1994; 15). Secularisation as it emerged at that time, however, was not meant to reduce the influence of religion over people's lives, as it was thought for a long time. On the contrary, it even appears that the restructuring – not the decline, as we will see - of religion was rather necessary to the “rise of the modern state as well as the development of the modern international society” (Thomas, 2003; 24).

We can now say that the main goal of the secularisation process that was triggered by the Westphalia Treaties was to withdraw religion its social regulatory prerogatives. However, the secularisation theory stated that religion was altogether going to disappear as a consequence of the confinement of religion to the private sphere. We will now try to understand where things went wrong: why did we witness, rather than a pure disappearing of religion, a change in the very concept of religion?

Secularisation after the Westphalia Treaty: “restructuring” religion rather than reducing its influence

As we said, upholders of the “secularisation” theory, that is the vast majority of social science and international relations scholars in the 20th century, were convinced that religion would eventually vanish, and that “democracy, free thought and open expression would allow ordinary citizens to challenge the myths and dogmas by which church authorities held people in servility […]” (Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011; 2). Indeed, the two main sub-theories that later emerged out of the secularisation theories both predicted a relative decline in religion: the “decline-of-religion” thesis, and the “privatisation” thesis (Casanova, 1994; 20). Both of them relied on the idea that, if modernity is considered as the consecration of “reason, science, technology and bureaucratic modernity” over “the religious, the spiritual or the sacred” (Thomas, 2000; 816), then the shift of religion towards a private concept (religion as a set of privately held beliefs), was “required for the emergence of modern international society” (Thomas, 2000; 26), as it strengthened the power of the state and supposedly proportionally reduced that of religion. However, it appears that those theories were built upon what Casanova calls “the main fallacy of the theory of secularisation”: they confused the actual historical processes with the “consequences that those processes were supposed to have upon religion” (Casanova, 1994, 19). The assumption that the Westphalian State was built against religion, and that its development would therefore have necessarily led to the disappearance of religion, appears to be historically inaccurate.

On the contrary, rather than the simple decline of religion, secularisation as envisioned in the Treaties of Westphalia actually aimed at a “restructuring of religion”, and a shift in its “symbolic boundaries” (Wuthnow, 1989; 10). And, as Peter Berger (2001) said, a shift in the function of religion, as the one that was targeted by the Treaties of Westphalia, or even a modification in the cultural form of a given religion, does not necessarily indicate a decline of that religion.

More than that, we can actually say that the Treaties of Westphalia even, in a way, opened the possibility for a strengthening of religious influence. Let's go back to Casanova's idea of double dualism in early-modern European society. While we have said that the Treaties of Westphalia were supposed to widen the “secular” sphere, and reduce the “religious” one “within this world”, they actually never intended to bring down the wall separating “this world” from “the other world”. Secularisation thus had two consequences. First, it allowed a new form of religion to emerge, solely private and separated from political “temporal” influences, which corresponded to a body of beliefs, able to express itself apart from “any ecclesial community” (Thomas, 2000; 822), and therefore keeping an important influence on people's lives, while emancipating itself from temporal structures to become a fairly spiritual concept. From this standpoint, secularism led to a form of essentialisation of the concept of religion. To use Casanova's image, this corresponds to the idea that the wall between “this world” and “the other world” was never brought down: what we could call the spiritual religious world remained intact, and was even strengthened. Second, by bringing down the “monastery walls”, to use Max Weber's famous analogy, rather than banning religion from the public sphere, secularisation actually allowed it to “flow out and permeate the wider society” (Madeley, 2008; 112), which is partly the reason why religion remained at the centre of European history after the Westphalia Treaty.

Therefore, we can now say that the Treaties of Westphalia, and the secularisation process they triggered, were never supposed to lead to the
uttermost disappearing of religion from the public sphere. On the contrary, because they reinforced the principle of cujus regio, ejus religio, according to which a given population’s religion should be that of its ruler, religion was a way for Westphalian States to reinforce their power. We can therefore say that Westphalian States and the modern international scene were built by setting in motion a restructuration of religion, which allowed a shift in the functions of religion, from a first-and-foremost social concept to a rather “spiritual” one. That clarification will help us better understand why the different forms of secularism as they evolved, despite the analysis of the upholder of the secularisation theories, actually made it possible for religion to come back in the public sphere.

Secularism as it evolved: not so detached from religion

The entire purpose of the first part of our analysis was to replace the concept of secularism within the historical framework it emerged from, without confusing the historical processes with a teleological analysis. We have shown that the main functions of religion at the time of the signing of the Treaties of Westphalia were functions of social regulation. The emergence of secularism after 1648 was therefore only aimed at reducing that precise function. But, as a consequence, we witnessed a restructuring of religion, that allowed it to evolve from a social to a rather spiritual phenomenon. What we will try to show in this part is how, because of the historical context we described earlier, the forms of secularism that emerged never truly managed to completely expel religion’s influence from people’s lives. Because we view secularism as a construction, we will follow Cinar’s definition of the concept as “a series of political projects that transforms and reinstitutes socio-political order on the basis of a set of constitutive norms and principles” (Cinar, 2005; 9). While many typologies have been proposed by scholars, from Taylor’s distinction between “independent political ethic” secularism and “common ground strategy” secularism (Taylor, 1998) to Casanova’s “liberal” and “civil republican” secularisms (Casanova, 1994; 216), we will focus on the varieties of secularism proposed by E. Hurd (2008; 23), namely “laicism” and “Judeo-Christian secularism” as they will allow us to understand how secularism never fully detached itself from religion.

Laicism: consecration of the Westphalian presumption, or “gift of Christianity”?

The concept of laicism originated in France and can be defined as “a coercive process in which the legal powers of the state, the disciplinary powers of family and school, and the persuasive powers of government and media have been used to produce secular citizens who agree to keep religion in the private domain” (Chatterjee, 2006; 60). Philosophically, laicism can be traced back to Hugo Grotius’ “etsi Deus non daretur…” (Grotius, 1632) principle, according to which moral norms would be binding on men “even in the absence of God”. In other words, by separating the existence of a God from the necessity to enforce some key moral principles, laicism consecrates the total exclusion of religion from the public domain, yet without denying its functions. From that standpoint, the concept of laicism directly derives from the Enlightenment preoccupations of operating, as Condorcet put it, a “transfer of sacrality”, from religion to reason, from the Church to the State. It therefore appears as the best illustration of the Westphalian presumption into action, which is the total privatisation of religion.

Laicism led to two different possible perceptions of religion: the first one declared religion altogether irrelevant to the public life, as laicism was intended to “facilitate governmental efficiency as well as to provide the basis for a unified politics of the state” (Falks, 1988; 381). The other one defined religion as a threat, and laicism as a way of restricting religions “to a space where they cannot threaten political stability” (Asad, 2003; 191). Whichever vision is considered, the development of laicism led to the idea that “Christian identity of the West was superseded and […] rendered irrelevant” (Hurd, 2008; 39), and was thus vastly responsible for the generalisation of the assumption according to which secularism was going to utterly marginalize religion. However, we will try to show that laicism, in its very formation, was never that far from religion. Once more, by falling into exclusively teleological analysis, many scholars failed to see the profound bonds between laicism and religion, which partly explain why religion wasn’t utterly marginalized.

By stating that the secular man “recognizes himself in a proportion as he frees and purifies himself from the superstitions of his ancestors”, Mircea Eliade (1959; 204) put into question the apparently strict separation between the
secular and the religious world, and opened the door for a broader questioning of the ability of laicism to eradicate religion. Because “by defining the temporal, laicists aspire to define or at least delimit the transcendental” (Hurd, 2008; 33), this directly raises the question of what is considered as religion by upholders of laicism. We can already see how the very nature of secularism as it emerged in 1648 poses a challenge to laicism in terms of restricting religion to the private sphere, as it necessitates a definition of religion by the secular sphere itself. However, in order to establish such a definition, laicism needs to rely on a specific understanding of what religion is, deeply embedded within the “monotheistic exclusivism of Christianity as the normative paradigm for understanding what religion is” (King, 1999; 36). As we have shown, early secularism that emerged after the Treaties of Westphalia led to a restructuring of religion, which became a “body of beliefs” rather than a “community of believers”. It is precisely that modern definition that was used by laicism to define religion and restrict it to the private sphere.

However, this raises two problems: first of all, while that definition of religion has come to be more or less accepted in Western countries by a majority of Christians, as Taylor puts it, it can lead to issues when “society diversifies to contain substantial numbers of adherents of non-Judeo-Christian religions” (Taylor, 1998; 36-37), whose conception of religion might be different from the one inherited from a different historical background.

Laicism, as the first (not chronologically) conception of secularism, because it is embedded within a specific historical context marked by the start of the restructuring of religion after the Treaties of Westphalia, therefore appears closer to religion than we might have thought. Because those Treaties never actually intended to “kill religion”, and allowed the religious phenomenon to endure – although at a different level – laicism couldn’t utterly ignore the religious phenomenon, as it necessarily defines itself in opposition to it, thus entering the “spectrum of theological politics” (Hurd, 2008; 36). This, in our view, is one of the reasons why it was unable to prevent the coming back of religion within the public sphere.

Judeo-Christian Secularism: religion as a source of civilisation unity

While laicism tried to implement a strict restriction of religion to the private sphere, making its profound bonds with religion somewhat difficult to highlight, it is not totally the case for the second variety of secularism. The definition of Judeo-Christian secularism was perhaps best foreseen by Alexis De Tocqueville in his analysis of the American society, when he stated that “in the United States, […] Christianity reigns without obstacles by universal consent […] religion, which never intervenes directly in the government of American society, should be considered as the first of their political institutions” (De Tocqueville, 1969; 292). What De Tocqueville showed was that, contrary to the kind of secularism that emerged in Europe after 1648, this second variety of secularism was the result of a different historical process. Rather than relying on the assumption of a strict separation of religion from the public sphere – as did laicism – it is still strongly embedded within the idea, prior to the Treaties of Westphalia and consistent with the Reformation principles that were those of the protestant majority in America at the end of the 18th century. According to these principles “God has instituted two kingdoms on Earth, one spiritual, to be ruled by the Church, and the other temporal to be ruled by a civil sovereign” (Gedicks, 1991; 117-118).

To go back, once more, to Casanova’s double dualism image, while the main aim of laicism was to widen the secular sphere “within this world” by containing religion to the private sphere, Judeo-Christian secularism, although it also sought to somewhat restrict religion to the private domain, also acknowledges the idea that “a Judeo-Christian tradition is thought to provide a moral basis for political life, [and that] religion is thought to perform a priestly function of legitimating political authority” (Jelen, 2000; 11). While laicism aimed at transferring the social functions of religion to the State, therefore “desacralizing” them, Judeo-Christian secularism viewed religion as a framework of shared traditions and values within which the State could evolve and enforce those values. In other Words, the secular State is viewed as a tool to enforce “certain things as transmitted to it from someone or something which already has that very same authority” (Wolterstorff, 2003; 25), that is religion. The United States of America is perhaps the best example of such a form of secularism, as shown by the numerous references to the sacred justifications of
its foreign and national policies (see, for example, George Bush’s 2003 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy: “liberty is both the plan of Heaven for humanity and the best hope for progress here on Earth”).

It therefore appears that the second variety of secularism that emerged after the Treaties of Westphalia, because it relies on its Judeo-Christian traditions in a way laicism does not, by definition, allows religion to play a role in the public sphere. Furthermore, in line with the goals of secularism as it emerged in 1648, it sees religion as a force able to cohabitate with the secular State, which relies on it and draws part of its legitimacy from it. By considering the Judeo-Christian religious traditions as a pillar of the modern Western State, Judeo-Christian secularism paved the way to Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” theory. According to him, “Western Christianity, first Catholicism and then Protestantism, is historically the most important characteristic of Western civilisation” (Huntington, 1996; 70), and its tradition of a dualism between religion and the State is part of its uniqueness, that allowed it to “take the lead in modernizing itself and the world” (Huntington, 1996; 72). By linking a religious legacy to the formation of civilizational units on the international scene, and by predicting the eventual “clash” of the Western civilisation with non Judeo-Christian civilisations in order to protect its “uniqueness”, Huntington was among the first to propose a theoretical approach to the return of religion within the international public sphere. However, his approach revealed several flaws. First of all, Huntington acknowledged the existence of a monolithic “Western civilisation”, whose relation to its Judeo-Christian legacy would be the same, from Europe to America. However, as we’ve shown, the connections that exist between the secular and non-secular spheres in countries where laicism prevailed is extremely different from that which prevails in countries with a Judeo-Christian type of secularism. By making religion the “sole essential feature of civilisations” and considering that “those entities are ontologically stable and fixed in terms of their essential inherent features” (Opschoor, 2007; 252), Huntington completely ignored the fundamentally different path taken by historically Judeo-Christian States regarding their relation to religion. Therefore, while Huntington’s theory did help understand parts of the justifications provided by the United States concerning their interventionist policies in the Middle East (Desch, 2013; 29), it is hardly generalizable to an apparently inexistent unique Judeo-Christian civilisation.

We can now say that, because secularism as it emerged after the 1648 Westphalia Treaties never intended to bring an ultimate end to religion’s influence, the two directions it followed made it possible for religion to stay present in the public sphere. Both laicism and Judeo-Christian secularism did pave the way to the coming back of religion as a factor international relations. However, because they had failed to acknowledge the actual historical processes within which the Westphalia Treaties led to the emergence of those secularism, and relied on a teleological interpretation of that concept, international relations theories failed to understand how the actual structure of secularisms could lead to the return of religion as an objective factor of international relations.

**Conclusion**

While religion remained an undebated topic in the field of international relations for many decades, a succession of events, especially the 9/11 attacks, made it impossible for scholars to avoid it any longer. Our hypothesis, according to which a misconception of the idea of secularism led international relations theories to strongly rely on a teleological analysis of the concepts of secularism that emerged after 1648, making it structurally impossible for them to cope with the topic of religion, has been partially verified.

Indeed, in order to avoid any confusion between the predicted consequences of secularism on the role of religion and the actual historical facts, we started by analysing the functions of religion at the time of the Treaties of Westphalia, considered as the starting point of the secularisation theory. What we showed was that religion in early-modern Europe was a fairly social concept, and that its main aim was to ensure a form of social cohesion. In 1648, the Treaties of Westphalia, by consecrating the principle of State sovereignty, had the objective of sending religion back to the private sphere. However, they never intended to deprive religion of its influence over people’s lives. By confusing a mere restructuring of religion with its planned utter disappearance, international relations scholars blinded themselves and failed to acknowledge the actual proximity of the different forms of secularism that emerged in the Western World after 1648 with religion. They posited religion had been wiped out the map of international relations studies, while religion never actually left. The
theories they then developed failed to see the phenomenon that led to a religious resurgence in the global scene. Because their ontological perspectives were not focused on individuals and the way religion influence their relations to the State, they failed to acknowledge the social phenomenon emancipating religion from the solely private sphere. And because their analysis of modernisation, and more specifically globalisation, was biased by their misunderstanding of the historical roots of the secularisation theory, they failed to predict the emergence of transnational religious actors.

That being said, now that the objective coming back of religion as a factor of international relations cannot be disputed any longer, we can only hope that international relations theorists will seize this opportunity to incorporate this phenomenon within existing theories, which are in our view structurally able to incorporate it. Understanding the historical mistake of the secularisation theory and its consequences on the unpredicted resurgence of religion is the first step towards an aggiornamento of international relations theories, which will require the difficult task of putting aside all forms of Western-centrism, and breaking the deeply-rooted idea of the absence of meaningful role of religion. The question being whether international relations scholars will be able to stop considering, like Keohane did in 2002, that they should leave religion to “those more qualified to address it” (Keohane, 2002), and start considering themselves as such.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Frida Bowe

Introduction

Last years revelations of the Panama Papers drew renewed attention to the role tax havens play in facilitating tax evasion for companies and wealthy individuals around the world. Estimates state that every year, approximately $3 trillion of government revenue is lost to tax evasion around the world, and a large amount of this through so-called tax havens (Lusiani, 2014: 1).

Capital’s ability to cross borders without restrictions has led to an expansion of tax haven activities throughout the world. This has developed an increasing concern regarding the causes and consequences of international tax differences. As a result, a series of anti-tax haven initiatives have developed, such as the OECD and the European Union’s Harmful Tax Competition Initiative, the United Nations proposed International Tax Organization, and the G20 Declaration of Strengthening the Financial System as well as national policies such as the US Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act. In 2009, US President Barrack Obama stated that he would restrain the usage of all offshore tax havens and corporate tax

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breaks, in order to collect billions of dollars more from multinational companies and wealthy individuals (Calmes & Andrews, 2009). However, as recently revealed by the Panama papers, this effort seems to have been unsuccessful. As of 2014, “at least 358 companies, nearly 72 percent of the Fortune 500, operate subsidiaries in tax haven jurisdictions” (Reuters, 2015).

Furthermore, tax havens are not only seen as a problem for America and other Western countries; the potential impacts associated with tax havens are often described as greater for the least developed countries (LDCs). These are the countries that, according to the United Nations and World Bank calculations, have the lowest socioeconomic development and lowest Human Development Index ratings (World Bank, 2016). Seeing as LDCs are poorer, and thus, have a weaker tax base, as well as fragile institutions, they are arguably more affected by tax losses. Moreover, the weak institutions in LDCs may facilitate capital flight or tax evasion. As a result, the government has more difficulties collecting enough money to improve the institutions and tax collection in the future (Fjeldstad, 2009).

Conversely, several academics argue that there are potential positive impacts of tax havens, such as lowering firms’ capital costs and, thus, leading to increased investment in tax havens as well as non-tax havens (Brennan & Buchanan, 1982: Blanco & Rogers, 2009: Hines Jr., 2010: Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr., 2006). Hence, from this perspective, tax competition positively benefits economic growth in developing as well as developed countries.

By focusing on the case of Zambia, this article asks under what conditions tax havens benefit development in LDCs. The article will first present a common definition of tax havens before setting forth the debate on how they can negatively and positively impact development in LDCs. Then, a case study of Zambia will be presented, to see what role tax havens have played in affecting development in the county. On this basis, the article will conclude that there is a trade off: The existence of tax havens opens up for more foreign direct investment, but it also massively reduces the government’s tax revenue. Due to lack of direct insight into the accounts of businesses, the overall impact is ambiguous. The case study of Zambia supports this, though it suggests that increasing taxes is not the solution as firms will reallocate, rather than pay. Consequently, the country should focus on improving its institutional framework so that it can collect a greater amount of its taxes and have control over the registered firms in its country, while pushing for international tax laws.

Definition of a Tax Haven

There is no clear tax rate that makes a country a tax haven. However, most lists of tax havens identify the same 52 countries, that combined have a population of 50 million and GDP of about 1.1 trillion dollars (Hines Jr., 2010: 105).

The OECD definition of a tax haven (Owens & Saint Amans, 2009: 11) is:

No or only nominal taxation (generally or in special circumstances) and offers itself, or is perceived to offer itself, as a place to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of residence;

Laws or administrative practices which prevent the effective exchange of relevant information with other governments on taxpayers benefiting from the low or no tax jurisdiction;

Lack of transparency;

No substantial economic activities.

One of the main ways tax havens facilitate international tax evasion is through ‘transfer pricing abuse’. This ‘occurs when a large corporation (i.e. one with multiple divisions) engages in intra-corporation transactions at non-market rates, with a view to ‘transferring’ its profits into countries where they will be taxed less heavily (tax havens)” (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2012-13). Under the current OECD regulations, transferring profits is legal and may be done for a variety of reasons, though it is prohibited, on grounds of tax evasion. However, when done in secrecy it becomes very difficult to determine the motive for the action and where the profits were generated.

How Tax Havens Negatively Influence Development in LDCs

The main argument for how tax havens negatively affect development in LDCs touches on what has already been mentioned: The loss of tax revenue
they represent. The OECD estimates that developing countries lose to tax havens almost three times what they get from developed countries in aid (The Economist, 2015). Calculations of LDC annual revenue losses due to tax havens range from the more conservative estimate of $15 billion to $50 billion, according to Oxfam (Christensen, Coleman, & Kapoor, 2008: 1). The latter figure includes both tax avoidance and “related capital flight”.

For most countries this is an important loss, but for developing countries, with a high portion of people living in poverty, businesses represent one of the main ways of gaining enough tax to provide for education, health services, pensions and other aspects a modern state needs. As stated by the chief economist of the World Bank, taxation “allows developing countries to invest in education, health and infrastructure, and, hence, in promoting growth” (The Economist, 2015). On average, LDCs collect around 13% of their GDP in tax, in contrast to developed counties where the figure is 34% (ibid.).

OECD published a report in 2011, highlighting how aid alone cannot solve the issue of development. The report argued that money to invest in development should preferably be generated domestically, in order to sustainably achieve and retain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The report estimated that an additional $120 billion is needed to accomplish the first six MDGs (Atisophon, Bueren, & De Paepe, 2011: 12). However, at the time of the report, half of the sub Saharan African countries collected taxes “below the minimum level considered by the UN as necessary to achieve the MDGs” (ibid: 17).

By using the figures presented by Oxfam as the annual tax losses in developing countries: over 40 percent of this money would be provided if governments in developing countries succeeded in cracking down on tax avoidance. In other words, based on these figures, the usage of tax havens can be seen to prevent governments from investing in the economy and developing infrastructure, that again “can crowd in’ private investment” (The Economist, 2015).

To avoid slashing public budgets to make up for the revenue lost, governments in LDCs may increase taxes on other aspects of the economy where taxes are seen as mainly a damper on economic growth, such as Value-Added Taxes (VAT) (Lusiani, 2014: 4). The people and business that cannot afford to invest in accountants or lawyers that can help them transfer payments to tax havens, will thus end up taking on the added burden of taxes.

Secondly, effective tax systems, based on cooperative relationships between governments, businesses and individuals, are often seen as central to democracy and growth (Lusiani, 2014). Research shows that governments that are dependent on taxes for their revenue “have incentives to bargain with their tax payers, strengthening the overall accountability, democratic and representative decision-making in government, and at the same time supporting the capacity of public institutions” (ibid.: 3). Henceforth, tax havens can potentially negatively affect this relationship of accountability by facilitating large-scale evasion, and thus making the government seek other means to gain revenue, weakening the accountability mechanism of government institutions. Many LDCs are characterised by weak or non-existent democratic systems (Gita Welch et. Al. 2006). The inability of taxes to function as an accountability measure and as an incentive for governments to be responsive to the needs of its citizens may further complicate the transitional path to democracy.

Thirdly, the mobility of capital means as mentioned that tax competition increases making the national tax base more sensitive. Many fear that the result of tax competition is an eventual ‘race to the bottom’ (Baldwin and Krugman 2004). This is a situation where the pressure to retain economic activities and businesses, lead governments to reduce taxes, eventually so low that large-scale public sector cuts have to made. The result of tax competition has mainly been “that owners of capital pay a relatively smaller proportion of total taxes and wage earners pay a higher share” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). This is because wages are seen as a more immobile tax object than capital income (Lipatov and Weichenrieder 2015). Consequently, the negative effect of tax havens on development in LDCs can be seen to be the fact that it distorts the tax base leading to inefficient taxes.
In sum, tax havens can be seen to prevent LDCs from mobilizing the maximum and most efficient resources, scarcely needed to further their development.

How Tax Havens Positively Influence Development in LDCs

Tax havens are a symptom of the existence of a competitive tax system. Several economists, such as Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, argue that politicians have an incentive to tax people more than necessary (Brennan & Buchanan, 1982). Tax havens can thus function as a counterweight to this, preventing governments from overtaxing its citizens. This is because capital mobility implies that citizens could relocate or move money to a tax haven, if they felt that their government over taxed them.

Secondly, development in LDCs may benefit from the existence of tax havens if they enable Multinational Companies (MNCs) to significantly reduce capital costs. This, because of the reductions in capital costs due to lower taxes, could potentially allow MNCs to invest more in non-tax havens as well as tax havens. For example, the use of tax havens can facilitate investment in high tax countries that would otherwise not have taken place (Hines Jr., 2010: 105). A study conducted in 2009, based on data from 1990 to 2006 in tax havens as well as non-tax havens, found that for LDCs, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are positively related with FDI inflows in the nearest tax haven (Blanco & Rogers, 2009). The study shows that LDCs experience positive spillovers due to tax havens. This is reiterated by Desai, Foley and Hines (2006). Their findings support the notion that “tax haven activity enhances activity in non-havens” (Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr., 2006: 7). This because, through tax havens firms can avoid some of the tax burden levied by domestic and foreign authorities, and thereby maintain a higher level of foreign investment than would otherwise have been possible (Ibid.: 7).

In addition, Hines (2010) argues that by obtaining financial and intermediate goods and services at a low cost in tax-havens, productivity and competitiveness of economic operations in non-tax havens increases and thus, the demand for production in those areas increases (Hines Jr, 2010: 115). This supports the notion that tax havens contribute to investment and development in LDCs rather than draining them for profit. However, the OECD and others reporting on the matter emphasise the opposite findings, indicating the high level of disagreement on the topic (Atisophon, Bueren, & De Paepe, 2011: Christensen, Coleman, & Kapoor, 2008).

Finally, in the case of LDCs it has been pointed out how many of these countries already have limited abilities to collect taxes and allocate resources efficiently. Corruption in LDCs tends to be high, and large sections of the economy informal. It has been shown that systems that are poorly designed and corrupt may “deter investment, innovation and employment and impede the economic growth that is ultimately the most important driver of sustainable revenue flows” (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2012-13: 92). The fact that “a fifth of tax collectors in the capital, Mogadishu, were killed in 2012-14” is indicative of the strength of the state (The Economist, 2015). In situations like that, where the state is highly corrupt and inefficient, the existence of tax havens can potentially lower the barrier of entry for MNCs considering to settle. This is because tax havens make it possible for companies to circumvent the local bureaucracy and easily channel their profits to the desired location. By operating through a tax haven the firm can, thus, minimise their contact with the local authorities.

From this perspective, tax havens contribute through increased investment and job creation, to development in LDCs.

A Case Study of Zambia

Zambia is one of the poorest countries in the world with 60 percent of its population living below the poverty line. However, in recent years the economy has been growing rapidly mainly due to the expansion of the copper mining industry and successful agricultural diversification (Economic Indicators: Zambia). Zambia has been successful in strengthening its governance and "democratic processes, with government institutions developing and reinforcing transparency and accountability efforts" (Rasmussen, Munkoni, & Lwanda, 2014: 2). Nevertheless, in spite of high economic growth, increased urbanisation and improved institutional framework, youth unemployment is very high and a major economic and social challenge for the country.
What makes Zambia a relevant case study is the resource rich economy. This implies, firstly, that the economy is dominated by some of the worlds largest MNCs and, secondly, resource rich countries often have greater difficulties developing (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2012-13: 6). Zambia’s copper production accounts for “70 percent of Africa’s production and 60 percent of the country’s total exports” (Trading Economics, 2016). Its also interesting to note that the country’s main export partner is Switzerland (45% of total exports) followed by China, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, despite the fact that the IMF recommended that the government focus on improving revenue collection as well as broadening the tax base. Currently tax collection is 17-18% of GDP, above the LDC average (Rasmussen, Munkoni , & Lwanda, 2014: 4-5).

Henceforth, Zambia is an LDC MNCs take an active interest in. Furthermore, the country has a large poverty issue so is in clear need of increased tax revenue, but is not in any way a failed state, rather a growing developing economy. For these reasons, Zambia’s experience with MNCs is likely to be relatable to other LDCs.

Zambia has experienced a large increase in FDI over the last ten years, representing a growing part of the country’s GDP. The majority of this investment has been in the mining industry, which “is the single most important recipient of large foreign direct investment (FDI) and accounts for about 10% of the formally employed” (Rasmussen, Munkoni , & Lwanda, 2014: 4).

The two main international mining companies in Zambia are Mopani Copper Mines, a joint venture under the Swiss company Glencore International AG, and Konkola Copper Mines, a subsidiary of the London and Mumbai based company Vendata Resources. Both of these companies are known to operate schools and healthcare facilities for their employees. In addition, they pay even the most junior staff at least US$508 per month in a country where the national monthly minimum wage is US$81 (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2012-13: 12). Judging by this, the international mining companies seem to contribute to growth and development in Zambia.

However, examining their tax returns offers a different picture. As seen from the export figure, Zambia exports nearly half of all of its copper to Switzerland. This is part of a chain described earlier as ‘transfer pricing abuse’. The copper is sold to Switzerland at the world average price, while the Swiss price for its copper exports is much higher (Lusiani, 2014: 5). According to Christian Aid “were Zambia to receive Swiss export prices for its exports to Switzerland, the total value received would in 2008 have been almost six times higher than it was, adding some US$11.4bn to Zambia’s GDP, which in 2008 was just US$14.3bn in total” (Blowing the Whistle Time's Up for Financial Secrecy, 2010: 23).

Furthermore, after the Zambian government ordered an enquiry into the tax reporting of Glencore, the British NGO, Action Aid estimated that Glencore paid around 108 million dollars less in taxes per year in Zambia, between 2003 and 2008, by channelling profits through Switzerland (Henn, 2013: 5). Overall, a report from the UK parliament calculated that the Zambian government gained little in tax revenue as “copper exports stood at $2 billion per annum, yet tax revenues from these were only $30 million: an effective tax rate of 1.5%” (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2012-13: 11). This means that if Zambia had been able to collect taxes at the same level as one of the worlds other major copper exporter Chile, tax revenues would in 2008 alone have been around $800 million (ibid: 11).

The comparison between the copper industry in Chile and Zambia is interesting seeing as Chile is a profoundly more developed country and a lot less corrupt (Transparency International, 2015). Further analysis of the Chilean mining industry is outside the scope of this article, but a study comparing the two countries could offer interesting insight into how a country best can benefit from their natural resources.

Moreover, Glencore denies participating in any tax avoidance (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2012-13: 18 ). If one offers them the benefit of the doubt, the reason they channel profits through Switzerland may be to avoid corrupt tax collectors and complicated bureaucracies. However, as pointed out in the Financial Times, Glencore uses the same strategy of
'transfer pricing' in Australia through the tax haven of Singapore (Smyth, 2015). Australia is one of the most developed countries in the world as well as one of the least corrupt states. Judging by this, Glencore’s activity seems purely to be a profit maximising tool.

Furthermore, without insight into Glencore’s accounts it is difficult to determine whether the avoided taxes were returned to Zambia in the form of investment. It is clear that FDI related to the mining industry substantially contributed to Zambia’s economy. However, according to the OECD report on the MDGs, corporate tax revenue is crucial in financing the necessary institutional improvements required for countries to achieve the MDGs (Atisophon, Bueren, & De Paepe, 2011). This is also the case for Zambia where the majority of its citizens live in poverty.

Many countries use tax competition as a way to attract more companies to invest and settle. For instance, Kenkola Deep Mine did not invest in Zambia before the mining giant Anglo-American Corporation had succeeded in securing a preferential tax rate of 25 percent in place of the standard rate of 35 percent (Christensen, Coleman, & Kapoor, 2008: 2). As has been shown, the literature is in disagreement on whether this is purely a sign of healthy competition or if it undermines the government’s ability to conduct an independent tax policy.

Recently the Zambian government decided to increase royalties on the mining industry. However, many of the main mining companies immediately stated that they would reallocate to The Republic of Congo (Antonioli, 2015). In a country where mining accounts for 12 percent of its gross domestic product and 10 percent of its formal employment, this would have had huge consequences for the economy. The government has since ended up renegotiating with the mining companies to ensure favourable tax rates that make them stay in Zambia.

This suggests that tax competition may have the detrimental effect argued: pushing governments to reduce taxes below the preferable level. The case of Zambia illustrates how LDCs have to negotiate with firms in order to get them to settle. In Zambia and other LDCs, MNCs get the upper hand, as the economy is so reliant on their jobs and investment.

**Conclusion**

Literature suggests that there is a trade-off between high taxes and increased business activity due to the ability of firms to reallocate. For LDCs businesses contribute to essential economic activity and growth. Simultaneously, the lack of corporate tax revenue hurts development, as LDCs greatly need more tax revenue due to a poor tax base.

The case of Zambia suggests that the ‘race to the bottom’ exists, and LDCs have little power faced with MNCs, due to firms’ ability to reallocate and the economy’s reliance on their activities. Furthermore, as in accordance with Desai, Foley and Hines (2006), it is clear that Zambia greatly benefits from MNCs and their investment in the economy. However, had the companies not practiced the system of ‘transfer pricing’ through Switzerland, it is evident that Zambia’s GDP could have been greater today.

In summary, necessary revenue is lost on LDCs through tax havens, but MNCs contribute through investment and jobs to their economies. However, as long as the economy is reliant on this investment and jobs from MNCs, LDCs have to maintain a favourable business tax rate. A cohesive international effort, therefore, seems like the most effective way of tackling the issue of tax evasion through tax havens.
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Why did the Irish Republican Army not use suicide tactics between 1968 and 1998?

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Introduction

Most groups seeking territorial autonomy from a democratic occupier have used suicide tactics (Pape, 2006). In the case of the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) struggle to expel British forces from Northern Ireland, suicide tactics never entered the fray. With this in mind, it is interesting to examine why the Irish Republican Army did not use suicide tactics between 1968 and 1998.

Definition

It is firstly important to define what is meant by “suicide tactics”. Bloom (2005) defines suicide attacks as a violent, politically motivated attack carried out in a deliberate state of awareness by a person who blows himself or herself up together with a chosen target. Corte Ibánez (2014) defines a suicide attack as an offensive operation whose execution depends upon the death of the perpetrator. It can be succinctly summarised that the academic viewpoint on suicide terrorism is that of a precise set of tactics that certain terrorist groups utilise in order to achieve strategic aims while resulting in the certain death of...
the perpetrator.

Myth of link with Islam

At this early point in the article it must also be understood that there is no inherent link between Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups and suicide terrorism. The link of 9/11 and the subsequent so-called ‘War on Terror’ with countries that had majority Muslim populations has led to the connection of suicide terrorism with fundamentalist Islamic groups. However, it must be clarified that there is no direct link between a group using suicide terrorism and being an Islamic group (Pape, 2006). If this popularly held viewpoint was indeed correct, then the worth of this article would be nil, as the IRA is not an Islamic organisation.

Suicide terrorism and territorial autonomy

Pape (2006) offers a convincing argument for why suicide terrorism is mostly connected with the struggle for territorial autonomy and not Islamic fundamentalism. He postulates that religion is merely used as a tool in recruiting members and in the service of broader strategic objectives. He continues to discuss how suicide terrorist groups began with having a secular and strategic goal; to compel democracies to withdraw their military forces from territory that the terrorist group considers to be their homeland. This position is reaffirmed by Pape and Feldman’s (2010) statistic that from the years 1980-2003, Islamic fundamentalism cannot account for even half of the suicide attacks in that time frame. In that same period, campaigns to compel democratic societies to abandon political control of territory accounts for 95% of suicide attacks. These statistics firmly show that during the height of the IRA’s fight against the British, suicide terrorism was primarily used by groups seeking territorial concessions from an outside democratic occupier.

Strategic logic of suicide terrorism

Ahmed (2005) offers an account describing the calculations that a group undertakes before beginning to use suicide tactics. He refers to Palestinian suicide bombing not as a culture of death, but rather a “despair of occupation” (Ahmed, 2005, p89). Palestinian suicide bombing only began after Dr. Banich Goldstein massacred twenty nine Palestinian worshippers in Hebron during Ramadan in 1994. In this instance, the use of suicide bombing is as a result of the asymmetric power in the occupied territory, and the decision that suicide bombing is the only tactic that may work in order to stop the suffering (ibid). While this argument is strong in that it furthers the discussion on the strategic use of suicide terrorism, it falls down in that it is slightly contradictory. The decision to utilise suicide tactics after the massacre in 1994 can quite clearly be understood as an emotional response to a ruthless occupier. This is at odds with Pape’s (2006) extensive piece on the “strategic logic” of suicide terrorism. For Pape, the tactic is not an irrational or manic one that results in the death of members of a terrorist organization, but a calculated, rational decision in order to improve the group’s aims. This is a more convincing argument than Ahmed’s (2005) one because it portrays the suicide terrorist as a rational actor who employs tactics that will maximise his utility.

The Case of Hezbollah

Pape and Fieldman (2010) use the case study of Lebanon to further explain how the use of suicide tactics by terrorist organisations is as a result of calculated decisions. On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon. Only one month later, Hezbollah was formed. The phenomenon of Hezbollah evolved from a history of developments driving discontent and fear among the Shia community. While the creation of Hezbollah was as a result of a large Shia resistance, the purpose of Hezbollah was to be more of an umbrella organization for discontented Lebanese rather than purely a religious group. The suicide attacks carried out by Hezbollah were a legitimate means of self defence against the foreign occupation and not religious martyrdom (Pape and Fieldman, 2010).

Throughout the 1980s, a multi-national force of French, American and Italian troops were sent to Lebanon to attempt to stabilise the situation. Bjorgo (2005) agrees that the suicide attacks against these troops were the cause of the decision to withdraw from Lebanon to the hands of Syria. On 23 October, 1983, a marine barracks bombing that killed 241 men occurred simultaneously to a suicide bomb killing 58 paratroopers at the French multinational headquarters. The American and French troops subsequently pulled out of Lebanon in the first half of 1984. President Reagan said of the decision, "We couldn't stay there
and run the risk of another suicide attack on the Marines” (Pape and Feldman, 2010, p204). The example of Hezbollah in Lebanon is a prime example of the rational strategic actor employing suicide tactics for his own gain, rather than as a desperate attempt to take revenge against the occupier, as Ahmed (2005) discussed. Hezbollah, in essence, paved the way for future suicide terrorists who would look to their example for how suicide tactics could work in expelling the foreign occupation. Groups such as Hamas, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were inspired by Hezbollah’s success (Hoffman, 2006). It is interesting why the IRA were not influenced by this success, as so many other terrorist groups at the time were.

**The Case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam**

The example of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) further gives rise to the argument that there is no inherent link between Islam and suicide terrorism. The LTTE is a mainly Hindu organization with weak Marxist links (Pape, 2003). The LTTE began fighting in Sri Lanka seeking an independent Tamil state in the Tamil dominated northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka (Pape and Feldman, 2010). In Sri Lanka in 1990, the population stood at 17.2 million with 74% Sinhalese who were mainly Buddhist, 18% Tamils who were mainly Hindu and 8% other who were mainly Muslim (Pape, 2006). Between 1987 and 2001, the LTTE carried out 76 suicide terrorist attacks. Pape (2006) is convincing in his argument of the coercive success of these attacks, describing it as evident in the fact that they twice compelled the Sri Lankan government to engage in serious sovereignty negotiations. The LTTE had the longest running suicide campaign in history (Pape and Feldman, 2010).

**The Case for Community Support**

The aspect of community support is one that can be used in explaining the use of suicide terrorism. This support had a key role in encouraging individuals to become suicide terrorists in Lebanon. Here, streets were named in honour of those who died carrying out suicide attacks and Martyrs Day has become an annual holiday on November 11th to venerate Hezbollah’s first suicide attacker in 1982. Similar memorials exist in Sri Lanka for members of the LTTE. Community support for martyrdom is necessary in order to have a level of success with suicide tactics. Volunteers are more likely to come by because of the high status they are awarded after their deaths (Hopgood 2005). Additionally, it encourages people to offer themselves up to be volunteers for suicide campaigns, as the volunteers know they will be treated in high regard after their death. This tradition is necessary in order to have an adequate amount of fighters. It is also necessary in order to maintain the length of a suicide campaign. This essay postulates that if the local community are against the use of suicide campaigns, then it is unlikely that the terrorist group will succeed in carrying out a suicide campaign, and certainly for that length of time. The IRA, acting in the small territory of Northern Ireland (a statelet of the United Kingdom) had to be complicit with what the nationalist community wanted.

**An Effective Level of Violence**

Hoffmann (2006) makes a very convincing argument on the point regarding concern for community support. He writes that the most successful ethno-nationalist group can determine an effective level of violence that is tolerable for the local population, that is tacitly acceptable to international opinion and modulated so as not to provoke governmental crackdown. This is a strong argument in explaining why the IRA would not have employed suicide tactics- they operated in a conservative, Catholic area and relied heavily on overt and covert support from the Irish diaspora in the USA. Perhaps if suicide tactics were employed, they would have totally distanced themselves from their allies both at home and abroad. Hoffmann’s (2006) account is possibly the strongest in explaining the decisions that successful ethno-nationalist groups take to further their cause. However, the point may be argued of how successful the IRA actually were, given that their campaign did not result in a thirty-two county Republic.

**Level of Competition**

Hoffman (2006) writes about how the level of competition in a region may persuade certain terrorist groups to employ suicide tactics. In the case of Hamas, he discusses how they had to carve out a distinctive niche in a crowded field of competing militant groups. Additionally, by 1989, the intifada was losing momentum and therefore the turn to extreme violence was viewed as a matter of necessity. Ricolfi (2005) agrees with Hoffman on this point regarding the level of competition in Palestine of groups fighting towards the same goal. Both secular and religious organizations were operating within the same territory to try
and achieve political control over Palestinian insurgency. This is a convincing argument when examining the case of Palestinian suicide terrorism, but it does not wholly stand up when used in the examples of Lebanon for instance. Hezbollah was an umbrella organization, thus Lebanon did not experience this level of competition that perhaps was felt fervently in Palestine (Pape and Feldman, 2010). In the case of the IRA, there were many splinter groups from the organisation, and other nationalist groups operating at the same time as the IRA, such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), yet the IRA were never driven to use suicide tactics out of a fear of the growing competition. The theory regarding levels of competition impacting on the likelihood of a group to use suicide tactics is thus weakened when compared to other examples of terrorist organizations who worked at the same time as the IRA.

Norms

The influence of norms in communities cannot and has not been ignored in discussions of suicide terrorism and indeed in terrorism in general. Hoffmann (2006) brings in the idea of norms with the examples of the Basque liberation group, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the IRA and how they tried to absolve themselves of responsibility for violent deeds. They alternated between portraying themselves as threatening and remorseful, which is probably a reaction to the norms in these communities. In other scenarios, terrorist groups would relish the thought of claiming the most violent of attacks. The IRA reacted in accordance with the norms of the Northern Irish community, showing remorse for their actions which perhaps were too violent or extreme (Kalyvas and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2005). This point links to the earlier discussion on community support. It is quite clear that community support and norms were necessary factors in influencing the IRA’s tactics, and that because of these factors, suicide tactics never entered into the equation.

Level of Community Support

It can be deduced from the relevant literature that the most salient factor in the decision to use suicide tactics is the level of community support. While the use of suicide tactics and the continuation of these tactics were supported by the communities existing near Hezbollah and the LTTE, the converse is true for the experience of the IRA. For a deeply Catholic organization relying on a relatively small, nationalist Catholic Northern Irish community, it is impossible to envisage a situation whereby extreme violence such as suicide tactics would be supported. That is not to say that the IRA did not recognise the merits of using suicide terrorism. This is evident based on the infrequent use of forced suicide missions carried out by the IRA. For instance, in October 1990, Patsy Gillespie was forced to drive a car of explosives that the IRA exploded by remote control at a British checkpoint (Kalyvas and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2005). Thus, it was not a mere problem of cognitive accessibility in carrying out suicide attacks for the IRA. It is clear that they had the means to carry out these attacks, but rather a question of choice in employing them, and a conscious rejection of this strategy. This rejection was based on the consideration of the support of the local nationalist community.

Hypothesis #1

If a group found themselves in the position whereby they could achieve political and personal success without the use of suicide tactics, then it is probable that they would do so. Suicide tactics has been referred to as a last resort (Pape and Feldman, 2010) and thus if these extreme measures did not need to be taken then the group would not need to adopt them. The IRA can be seen to have had success in terms of the territory they controlled in South Armagh, along the border with the Republic of Ireland. Hardnen (1999) describes this region as the IRA’s most effective operational field, and indeed the ‘sniper country’ as it was known, was a taxing arena for the British to fight in. However limited the successes of the IRA were, in that they did not result in territorial autonomy of Northern Ireland, their successes were evident. Thus the utilisation of suicide tactics was not a necessary step.

H#1: The greater the level of success of a terrorist group, the less likely they are to adopt suicide tactics.

Hypothesis #2

Corte Ibáñez (2014) postulates that a decision to promote a suicide campaign is more likely when several terrorist groups co-exist in the same territory. Hoffman (2006) discusses the need for Hamas to carve out a niche for themselves in an arena of competing militant groups fighting for the same aim.
He describes a situation in 1989 where the intifada was losing momentum due to a crowded field of terrorist groups, and thus extreme violence was necessary in order to set themselves apart and have any hope of achieving their aims. Hoffman (2006) uses the same logic as Pape (2006) in surmising that suicide terrorism is not merely a product of intense personal frustration, but rather it is an organizational imperative that can be utilised to benefit a group when they are competing against other terrorist groups with the same aim.

H#2: The greater the concentration of terrorist groups with similar aims, the greater the use of suicide tactics.

Hypothesis #3

As discussed previously, community support is a necessary factor for the use and encouragement of suicide tactics. While the likes of Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers could not have operated suicide tactics without the support of the local community, the same was true for the IRA. Kral (1998) refers to how the logic and method of suicide is socially embedded in communities. The IRA was a deeply Catholic organisation, and suicide was considered a mortal sin. A conservative, nationalist, Catholic, Northern Irish population between 1968 and 1998 would not have supported the use of suicide tactics.

H#3: The use of suicide tactics by a terrorist group depends on the level of local community support.

Independent Variable

The level of community support in Northern Ireland is the independent variable in exploring why the IRA did not employ suicide tactics. The nationalist community in Northern Ireland during the period 1968-1998 was a deeply Catholic one. Suicide was thought of as a mortal sin (Linos, 2010), and it is inconceivable that the nationalist community in Northern Ireland would have applauded or encouraged the use of suicide tactics by the IRA. The IRA had to maintain a certain level of violence, but only a type that would not alienate the nationalist community that they claimed to be fighting on behalf of. Bishop and Mallie (1987) describe the violence as intending to "only distort the public and private life of the North". It was realised that the IRA could not act in such a way that would alienate the community around them, as this would indeed decrease the level of popular support for the group. In 1977, Gerry Adams, the present leader of the political party Sinn Féin, said the republican movement had to be forced into a complete and utter reliance on the people's support (Gambetta, 2005). While it is clear that the reliance on community support was evident for the IRA during the period 1968-1998, it is also clear that this community would not have supported the use of suicide tactics.

Analysis of Hypotheses

While the first hypothesis concerning the impact of a terrorist group's success on their decision to utilise suicide tactics can be seen as relevant to the case of the IRA, the same cannot be said of the second hypothesis concerning the impact of the level of competition on the decision to use suicide terrorism. While the arena of Northern Ireland cannot be viewed as crowded as that of Palestine in terms of the amount of terrorist groups fighting towards the same aim, it cannot be said that the IRA operated on their own in Northern Ireland. While the crucial player from spring 1972 was that of the Provisional IRA, splinter groups of the IRA as well as groups such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) still existed and operated in Northern Ireland (Bowyer Bell, 1997). The theory and research design has deduced that the third hypotheses regarding the correlation between level of popular support for suicide terrorism and the level of suicide terrorism, is the most salient one in exploring the particular question of why the IRA did not use suicide tactics.

Concept of Self-Sacrifice

The concept of martyrdom is not unknown in the tradition of Irish or Northern Irish politics. While martyrdom is an important factor in the carrying out of suicide terrorism in Lebanon, for instance, martyrdom also has important connections with the Northern Irish struggle against the British. Sweeney (1993) writes extensively on the cult of self sacrifice that existed in Ireland and on how it culminated in the famous hunger strikes of 1981 in Maze Prison in Belfast. These hunger strikes are a crucial event in understanding the trajectory of the IRA's struggle. In 1981, ten IRA and INLA members died in Belfast's Maze Prison because their demand to be recognised as political prisoners was rejected (Merari, 2005). Sweeney (1993) discusses how hunger strikes are linked to religio-political martyrdom and can be traced back to pre-Christian eras in
Ireland. At this time, hunger strikes were a tactic employed by the powerless against the powerful. This tactic continued long after the establishment of Christianity in Ireland, and eventually fasting became more of a symbolic gesture. Sweeney (1993) comments on how the hunger strikes were portrayed as a passive protest for a legitimate right; political status. It is important to note that the hunger strikes were portrayed as a passive means of resistance, and not as an act of suicide.

Hunger Strikes and Popular Support

The correlation between the level of support for the hunger strikes and the level of support for the IRA is noteworthy, as it corroborates the theory of how the use of suicide tactics by a group depends on the level of popular support for the suicide tactics. The popular support for the imprisoned Republican prisoners was one of the most intense periods of political protest and activity in twentieth-century Ireland (McKearney, 2011). Those who may have initially had reservations about the IRA also had issue with the way the prisoners were being treated, and the ordinary people began to take the side of the IRA. While the Republican leadership recognised the power of mass popular action, they forged a centrist parliamentary path instead of creating a revolutionary movement (McKearney, 2010). After the ten hunger strikers died at Maze Prison, popular support for the IRA and Sinn Féin (the political wing of the group) began to rise. Provisional Sinn Féin won 7.7% of votes in local elections in 1981 and 10.1% in the Northern Irish Assembly elections of that same year (Sweeney, 1993). The leadership did not trust the popular movement, resulting in a modest support base. Just as the IRA had withdrawn arms training from non-members in the early 1970s, their reluctance to put their faith in the people was evident once more (McKearney, 2010). While the IRA were wary of putting their faith and the future of the organization into the hands of the ordinary people, the impact that popular community support had on the IRA is evident.

Conclusion

This paper has questioned why the IRA did not use suicide tactics during the period known as ‘The Troubles’, between 1968 and 1998. The puzzle exists because it is widely understood that terrorist groups seeking territorial autonomy from a democratic foreign occupier are those that are most likely to engage in suicide terrorism. This paper postulates that the most salient factor contributing to a group’s decision about whether or not to use suicide terrorism is that of community support. The IRA operated within a small Catholic, nationalist community, and it is inconceivable to envisage popular support amongst this group for suicide tactics. The relevance to social science of the question of why the IRA did not use suicide tactics has to do with counter-terrorism. In understanding reasons why terrorist groups choose to utilise or not utilise suicide tactics, policy makers are in a better position to tackle such groups and their actions.


Marx’ Concept of Alienation and its Relevance to Work in the Contemporary World

Rachel Cooney

Marx’s theory of alienation continues to be a highly contested concept within sociology and one that with each decade gains new understanding and reworked meanings built upon the historical framework. Marx’s theory of alienation is an intellectual construct in which Marx describes the devastating effect of capitalist production on individuals, both physically and mentally, as well as its impact on the social processes of which they are a core part (Ollman, 1976). For Marx, human labour was central to the organisation of society and thus at the core of alienation theory (Swain, 2012). Employment plays a significant role in an individual’s life; be it positive or negative, it is arguably the basis around which everything else revolves. Throughout the years the theory has grown and declined in popularity within academic realms. However, this essay aims to define one of Marx’s core theories through the context of more modern examples of alienation within the workplace as discussed in the works of C Wright Mills and Arlie Hochschild, as well as with examples from current affairs. The core theory of alienation will be examined while exploring its relevance in sociological theory today and its significance in the contemporary workplace.

Alienation was one of the three main flaws Marx found in capitalism, along with exploitation and inefficiency (Elster, 1986). Marx developed his theory of alienation to reveal the human activity which lies behind the seemingly impersonal forces which dictate society (Cox, 1998). For Marx, the ability to work was the most important aspect of human existence, the necessity and ability to produce a means of sustenance was what separated us from animals. Animals only produce what they physically need in order to survive, man however “only truly produces in freedom from physical need” (Fischer [Marx], 1970). Feuerbach, Hegel and English Political Economy are known to be the most significant influences on the formation of Marx’s theory of alienation (Meszaros, 1970) however Marx’s definition of alienation differs to that of Hegel and Feuerbach as he places emphasis on the individual’s own choice and its impact on the individual in lieu of Hegel’s more religious ideas around freedom and the root of all understanding coming from God (Tucker, 1961). Feuerbach later went on to argue that through religion man becomes alienated, as individuals projected their highest aspirations onto the divinity, they emptied themselves of their own powers, as they view themselves as unworthy and in need of help from a higher power. This ultimately leads to estrangement from their own life and destiny (Baum, 2006). While Marx agreed with the atheistic option of Feuerbach, he argued that Feuerbach did not provide adequate explanations for the social reasons why individuals project the best within themselves onto the divinity (Baum, 2006).

Marx developed a three-part theory whereby alienation is divided into key stages. The first stage, alienation from the product, meaning that the worker is not in the position to decide what they make or what happens to it post production as the product is not their own to do as they please with (Cox, 1998), and in most cases the product is far beyond the worker’s reach financially. The more the worker labours the more goods they produce, but this good represents a decline in their powers because they cannot reap the fruit of their labour (Maguire, 1972). Marx states “the worker puts his life into the object” (Ollman, 1976) summing up the time and effort exerted in production; the worker’s products are external to the worker, as they cannot use them to progress further or to provide sustenance for themselves. Man becomes dependent on and subsequently controlled by the product he produces as it becomes his source of income.
The second stage of the process, alienation from the means of production, refers to the hours spent creating the product in a manner dictated by an external force, such as a manager or a manual. Therefore, it is not a voluntary action but rather a forced labour. This coerced labour has both detrimental physical and mental implications (Cox, 1998), ranging from over- and under-developed muscles, back pain and repetitive eye strain to anxiety, depression and boredom; all of which are arguably still commonplace today. In hand made craft and manufacture, the worker makes use of the tools and skills, in the factory; the machine simply makes use of him (Fischer, 1970). Marx claims that as a result of this form of alienation man can only take comfort in animalistic activities such as eating, drinking and fornication as he wants to partake in these activities, all other activity cause discomfort and unease (Marx, 1844). The Labourer, “Does not fulfil himself in work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than well-being, does not develop his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased. The worker, therefore, feels himself at home only during his leisure time, whereas at work he feels homeless. It is not his own work but the work for someone else (Marx, 1844).”

Unfortunately, there are many contemporary examples of alienation from the means of production. Thousands of individuals around the world are employed in jobs they don’t enjoy, doing work they care little about and in a place they despise; all for the reward of a salary at the end of the month. This has led to the living for the weekend phenomenon. Arguably the bulk of such employment stems from multi-national corporations, whose sole purpose is to generate capital, regardless of the human and environmental costs.

Marx distinguishes between ‘living labour’ and ‘dead labour’. Living labour referring to the work done by the labourer whereby elements of the labourer’s skills are employed and aspects of the labourer themselves are incorporated into the final product (Swain, 2012). An example of living labour could be a craftsperson; their skills, time and energy are put into creating the final product. Dead labour being the opposite, shown in today’s world by the reliance on machinery to complete tasks that humans once performed, these machines represent embodiments of past labour and can be seen as a threat as they replace actual workers (Swain, 2012).

Alienation does not solely reflect the relationship between the individual and the manufactured product but rather goes onto intertwine and shape all relationships within society (Swain, 2012). The third stage of the process, alienation from the species, species referring to fellow human beings, transpires when workers begin to see each other as competitors for wages and opportunities for promotion creating tensions between individuals (Cox, 1998). Competition for employer’s attention is often seen today in ‘Employee of the Month’ or ‘Top Seller’ which employees are encouraged to actively compete for, fuelled by the promise of praise and possibly a slight increase in wages with often negative effects on workforce harmony and morale. However, the forms of alienation vary according to social class as their position and lifestyle differ, with the working class (proletariat) situation the most dire (Ollman, 1976). In a perfect situation, self-realisation would be able to take place: man would be able to provide for himself only what he himself needs, he would have the time and space to develop his personal interests and to realise what is unique and specific to him (Maguire, 1972). For Marx an alienated individual becomes a fragmented version of his former self, a dull mere shell of a man. Communism therefore acts as a form of reunification, allowing these ideals to flourish for the greater good of mankind, a positive affirmation of human nature (Ollman, 1976). Inevitably these ideals are denied in a capitalist society due to extensive specialisation within nearly all realms of work and mass production controlled by transnational companies. However, it is important to note that Marx does not wholly condemn the division of labour, as he argues that it is a form of species-activity, and expression of man’s sociality and essential dependence on others and therefore a core part of human nature (Maguire, 1972). From an economic standpoint some form of the division of labour is integral to any organised form of labour.

Marx went on to argue a possible fourth dimension whereby the capitalist himself can potentially suffer the horrors of alienation too. However, the capitalist’s role in his alienation is a passive one in place of one that is imposed (Ollman, 1976). He suffers social isolation as he cannot form a human relationship with his employees. Marx argues that the capitalist takes comfort in this self-alienation as he is aware that this alienation is the result of his own power (McLellan, 1995). The capitalist’s purchasing power is limited however not to the same extent as the worker and he also experiences alienation from
the product, arguably to a greater extent as he has no part in the process of production (Ollman, 1976).

Despite a decline in popularity within sociology, especially in the 1960's and 1970's, Marx's original theory of alienation is arguably more relevant today than ever due to globalisation and an increased dependency on technology. For the first time in history, the world can provide for everyone yet despite this, millions continue to live in poverty and hunger (Cox, 1998). Contemporary fascination, almost obsession, with the latest high tech products fuels a regime of managerial autonomy and assembly line monotony, all hidden away from the public eye, thus creating the modern day alienated horror so many workers experience (Chan, 2013). Factories much like the ones that Marx himself was disgusted by as a result of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain, still exist in many parts of the world. The employees, many with little to no education and mostly from rural areas, are subject to gruelling shifts often without sufficient breaks. The conditions that many workers are forced to endure violate numerous health and safety codes; all working without basic rights, in return for reward of an ever slightly higher wage in comparison to the national average. An example of this could be Foxconn, one of the largest employers in the world with reportedly 1.4 million employees and factories throughout China (Chan, 2013), which specialise in the manufacture of high tech products for companies such as Apple, Sony and HP (Moore, 2012). In 2010 it came to light that Foxconn owned factories were allegedly run in a military like manner and subsequently led to the death of fourteen out of eighteen workers, ranging in ages from seventeen to twenty-five, all of whom jumped from the top of the company's buildings in Shenzhen, China (Chan, 2013). Those lucky to survive told of the dehumanising assignment of employee numbers for identification, compulsory unpaid staff meetings, enforced silence while working and a mere one day off every second week (Chan, 2013).

In 2012 in Wuhan an incident took place in another Foxconn owned factory where a hundred and fifty workers threatened to commit suicide due to the appalling conditions (Moore, 2012). Employees described how the assembly went too fast and how they were left with blackened hands and blisters at the end of the day (Moore, 2012). As a result of mounting public pressure, Foxconn erected 'anti-suicide' nets around its factories (Watts, 2010), arguably only adding to the feeling of alienation and powerlessness experienced by so many of the workers.

In C. Wright Mill's work White Collar; The American Middle Classes, strong links to Marx's concept of alienation are evident throughout. He draws attention to the mostly negative historical attitude to work such as that of the Hebrews and in primitive Christianity. Only from the sixteenth century onwards with the appearance of new waves of Protestantism, namely Calvinism and Lutheranism, was work seen as a core and rewarding part of human existence. Wright Mills argues that 'this gospel of work' has been intrinsic to the tradition of the United States in particular, both in the image of itself and its image to the outside world (Wright Mills, 1951). However, during the course of the twentieth century he notes a detachment from this former model with the development of capitalism and the enforced regulation and specialised tasks that come as part of it. He notes that most work has a generally unpleasant quality, with little to no positive gains to be made. He charts the division of 'white collar' work, arguing increased specialisation has led to lower skill levels and alienation in a workplace that was once bustling with interest in the work tasks. Craftsmanship, he ascertains, is the optimum state of labour for an individual, it resembles Marx's state of 'un-alienation' in essence, in that it allows the individual to fully benefit from his work, with no ulterior motives or hierarchal imposed controls, in the ideal of no separation 'between work and play or work and culture' (Wright Mills, 1951). Changes in the working day to favour shift work and even the placement of clocks in the workplace, something seemingly benign and even progressive, have been put in place to micro manage production ensuring maximum profitability for the owner/multinational corporation at the ultimate cost of the worker (Swain, 2012).

' The Managed Heart' (Hochschild, 2003 [1983]), in which Hochschild applies elements of Marx's theory of alienation in relation to the emotional labour of service industry workers, particularly by air hostesses in the 1980's. She reports how air hosts and hostesses, traditionally considered a female occupation, were ranked by their attentiveness and friendliness to passengers across various American airlines. She found that airline employees are simply
expected to grin (literally in some cases due to strict company policies) and bear whatever passengers may throw their way, regardless of how they may be feeling. Hochschild (2003[1983]) states "Where the customer is king, unequal exchanges are normal". This is in stark contrast to our private lives where all relationships are based on equality, creating a sense of powerlessness frequently cited in Marx’s theory of alienation. Air hostesses were (and may still be) subject to gruelling appearance regulations, controlling weight, length of hair and even what underwear could be worn, essentially stripping them of what made them unique in order to meet a desired standard. As the shift from industrial to service economy continues, physical exploitation is less commonplace than what it may have been a hundred years ago, whereas emotional exploitation is visibly rampant in today's society, from waiters to hairdressers and even teachers. Alienation is characterized by the universal extension of 'saleability' (Meszaros, 1970) which is seen more and more within service industries. As private capacities for empathy and warmth become marketable commodities and the conversion of human beings into 'things' employees are made to feel replaceable leading to increased reports of low morale and anxiety among service industry employees, as well as a loss of humanity (Meszaros, 1970).

In conclusion, it cannot be denied that in today’s world Marx’s influence transcends the boundaries of Marxism, ranging from economics to history, psychology to sociology and even political theory. All have absorbed many key ideas developed by Marx (Fischer, 1970). Marx is frequently criticized as being too idealistic in his theories and is vague on the topic of how to go about re-humanizing labour; in fact, no alternative is ever offered in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 as Maguire highlights in his analysis of Marx's Paris Manuscripts (1972). Undoubtedly Marxism has its limitations and many argue that labour based Marxian human nature is too simple to cope with the complexity of the modern world (Arie, 2006). Despite this there is still a lot to be gained from Marx's core theories such as alienation, in order to develop a greater insight into the social implications of modern day work on the individual and society as a whole; as shown in Hochschild's and Mill's works where the impact of alienation is clear to see.

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Hostile receptions of Islam into the Western world: Religion as a “barrier” to migrant integration

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Introduction

Immigrant integration has increasingly become a sensitive and volatile topic in the Western world. Rising securitization, the roll back of open-door migration policies and growing anxiety towards “difference”, is contributing to a concoction of intolerance in the West. This forges bitter and threatening receptions in host countries for vilified groups of migrants, particularly for Islamic individuals whose identities are often posited as the religious and racialized “other”. The recent success of the Brexit campaign and the election of Donald Trump as the United States’ President, demonstrate the increasing acceptability and even celebration of xenophobia, racism and Islamophobia. Increased restrictions on inward migration flows into the Western world are justified on the basis of protecting nationalism and “native” culture. Trump’s “Muslim ban” and his administration’s proposal of compiling a Muslim registry indicate not only fascist leadership, but the normalisation of Islamophobia. The perpetuation of a “good/bad” immigrant dichotomy is unfortunately a central trope to these discussions. Anti-immigrant rhetoric is defended through the criminalisation of certain migrant groups and the perceived threat they pose.
Increasingly Muslim migrants have been subjected to this kind of scapegoating in both the United States and Western Europe.

**Contextualisation**

A pervading theme in migration studies is the tendency for scholars to focus solely on the behaviour of immigrants themselves when analysing mechanisms of migrant integration. Similarly, when discussing migrant incorporation in the host society, scholars have tended to focus on structural indicators of integration, such as labour market activity, and less on non-quantifiable indicators of migrants’ lived experiences in the host country. In recent years, migrant scholars have attempted to analyse the role that religion plays in the incorporation of immigrants into host societies (e.g. Hirschman, 2007; Kastoryano, 2007; Foner & Alba, 2008). Foner & Alba’s (2008) research explores the extent to which religion can advance a migrant’s integration into social, cultural, economic, and political realms of the host society. Their findings conclude that religion acts as a “bridge” to integration for immigrants in the United States, but impedes the integration of immigrants in Europe (Foner & Alba, 2008). This essay will fundamentally disagree with the notion that incoming migrants can integrate into Western societies on the basis of religion. It will do so on the supposition that religion acts as a barrier for Islamic immigrants in both the United States and Europe. While Foner & Alba’s research attempts to speak to the lived experience of migrants in Western countries, it neglects the context of host societies which impede autonomous integration for immigrants. The focus of this paper will point to less tangible and quantifiable indicators of integration which reveal the trials and tribulations Muslim immigrants face in the Western world. I will argue that religion acts as a barrier for the integration of Muslim immigrants in both the U.S. and Europe, due almost exclusively to the reception of Islam by the host society.

Arguments that present religion as problematic in Europe have focused almost exclusively on Islam. For this reason I will critique Foner & Alba’s thesis by analysing the experience of Muslim migrants in Europe and the U.S. For the purposes of this essay, France will be used as the primary example to explain the often hostile reception of European societies to Islamic migrants. France was chosen for this analysis as its aggressive policies of secularity pose disproportionate challenges to Muslim communities, whose religious expression is increasingly targeted. Furthermore, French secularity disputes Foner & Alba’s thesis that religion can enable immigrants to integrate effortlessly into host countries. This essay will attempt to create a multifaceted approach to analysing Muslim migrants’ experiences of integration in the host society. It will do this by juxtaposing structural measures (which support Foner & Alba’s thesis) with indicators that disprove their thesis, namely the lack of Muslim representation in politics, anti-Muslim attitudes among host society members, and explicit social exclusion of Islamic migrants in mainstream society.

**History of Immigration**

Despite its colonial history, the United States sees itself as a nation built by immigrants. The country is now what some scholars refer to as “super-diverse” (Casanova, 2007). Since 1965, the U.S. has been a destination for immigrants from around the world, particularly from Asia and the Americas. Western Europe, on the other hand, has historically been an area of mass emigration (Casanova, 2007). Pre-1965 immigrants of predominantly European descent have been afforded the privilege of assimilating into the (white Christian-Protestant) American mainstream over time (Hirschman, 2007). Between the 1850s and 1930s, Catholic and Jewish immigrants experienced religious discrimination and prejudice in the U.S. (Kalkan et al., 2009; Hirschman, 2007). Both groups were seen as culturally “inferior” by the Protestant mainstream and experienced xenophobia and “othering”. However, increased contact with the White, Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) mainstream saw Catholics and Jews acculturate and assimilate (Kalkan et al., 2009). Essentially the boundaries of “whiteness” were expanded so that Jewish and Catholic immigrants, such as the Irish and Italians, were seen as white Americans. This historical context is important for understanding Muslim immigrant relations in the U.S., due to their ethnic minority status, as well as their religious status.

On the other hand, since the 1950s guest workers predominantly from poorer nations have migrated to mainland Europe for economic opportunity. “Traditional immigrant-receiving” countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, which were previous colonial rulers, have the longest histories of immigration. Up until recently the majority of migrants in Western Europe have
been Muslim, which has caused immigration to become somewhat synonymous with Islam in the European context (Casanova, 2007). Anti-immigration rhetoric is not uncommon as “most European countries still have difficulty viewing themselves as permanent immigrant societies, or viewing the foreign born…as nationals” (Casanova, 2007; 60). France has the largest Muslim population per capita of any Western country in the world, with Muslims making up 6.5% of the population (Bird, 2005). This makes France an interesting case study with regards to the integration of Islamic immigrants and second generation Muslims in Europe. For this reason alone the significance of France’s policy of laïcité cannot be overlooked.

Defining Migrant Integration

The Economic and Social Research Institute in Ireland defines migrant “integration” as the process by which immigrants are accepted into a host society (ESRI, 2010). Essential to this process is the role of both migrants and members of the dominant host society (ESRI, 2010). Conceptualising “integration” is difficult, as the experiences of migrants are often too abstract to quantify with empirical research. The fundamental goal of migrant integration is achieving social, political, economic, and cultural equality. Thompson & Crul (2007) affirm that integration is not one process and therefore should not be conceptualised in a reductionist manner. The ESRI (2010) asserts that using quantifiable measures of structural integration, such as employment rates and educational attainment, can indicate a great deal about migrant’s experiences in the host country. However, they do warn that empirical data is limited and does not shed light on more abstract experiences of acculturation. The following sections will explore Islamic migrants’ experiences in France and the US with regard to structural measures and less tangible experiences of integration. It will be argued that while structural dimensions are helpful in assessing issues of inequality, they do not speak to migrants’ sense of belonging and acceptance to the host society.

Differential Experiences

Foner & Alba (2008) have tried to explain the differential experiences of second-generation Muslim migrants in the U.S. and Europe, using structural measures of integration and assimilation theory. According to Thompson & Crul (2007) second generation Muslim immigrants have experienced “downward assimilation” in Europe, while those in the U.S. experience “straight line assimilation”, meaning each succeeding generation do better than those before them. While structural measures might support Foner and Alba’s thesis to a certain extent, experiences of Muslim migrants in the U.S. and Europe are not as disparate when non-quantifiable experiences are taken into account. Thompson & Crul (2007) affirm that because the process of integration involves different sectors of society, individuals’ identities and psychology, it should be analysed through a multidimensional lens.

Religiosity in the United States

Religious tolerance in the U.S. seems to cater mostly to those from “Judeo-Christian” backgrounds. Foner & Alba (2008) claim that the United States is “considerably” more religious than Western Europe, even stating that it provides a “foundation for greater acceptance…of non-Christian religions” (375). While religiosity has historically underpinned the cultural fabric of the US, mainstream American society still favours Christian identity and Protestant values in particular (Awad, 2010). Moreover, Foner & Alba’s argument fails to take different waves of migration into consideration. When referring to the “bridging effect” of religion in the U.S, they focus primarily on the Judeo-Christian model of pre-1965 migration, admitting that Catholicism and Judaism have received “charter status” in what is now considered a “Judeo-Christian nation” (Foner & Alba, 2008; 380). Despite providing evidence that migrants outside of the Judeo-Christian model are discriminated against by wider society, the authors claim that Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism are recognised as “legitimate” faiths (Foner & Alba, 2008).

Secular “Post-Christian” Europe?

Secular “post-Christian” Europe is distinguished from the religious pluralism of the United States (Casanova, 2007). Since the 1960s, rates of religiosity in Europe have been on the decline. The policy of laïcité in France enforces the “strict privatization of religion” and attempts to “regulate” religious practice (Casanova, 2007), particularly that of Islam. However, it is argued that Europe is “torn” between two competing cultural identities; that of secular liberalism and that of Christian heritage. While this Christian heritage is not
verbalised in secular policies and secularism is touted as the “new religion” of France, a large majority of Europeans (approximately 70%) still identify as Christian (Casanova, 2007). Secular policy in France is framed as liberal, progressive, and modern. This legitimises anti-Muslim rhetoric that frames Islam in opposition to these values, asserting that it is fundamentalist, radical and anti-modern. According to Berry (2005) the “Othering” of Muslims serves to undermine intercultural relations and goals of mutual accommodation and adaptation. Secularism perpetuates the myth of a “post-Christian” Europe and legitimises anti-Islamic rhetoric and policies that undermine religious freedom.

Economic Integration: France & the U.S.

Adida et al. (2010) contend that religious discrimination in the French labour market against Muslims is significant. In their Curriculum Vitae (CV) experiment which controlled for country of origin, gender, age and multiple competing factors, the authors found that for every 100 positive responses a Christian applicant receives, a Muslim applicant receives 38 positive responses (Adida et al., 2010). Therefore, Muslim applicants are 2.5 times less likely to receive a call-back interview than their Christian counterparts, despite having identical qualifications and all other differences considered (Adida et al., 2010). Furthermore, the authors found that second generation Muslim migrants make €400 less per month than their Christian counterparts. While this research was only conducted in one sector of the French labour market, it does indicate significant anti-Muslim attitudes in recruitment practices.

Different migrant flows into Europe has meant that Muslims in Europe tend to be of lower socioeconomic status and are primarily labour migrants (Savelkoul et al., 2011). In contrast, Muslim-Americans tend to come from more affluent backgrounds and first-generation Muslim immigrants generally have higher levels of human capital prior to migration than those that migrate to Europe (Savelkoul et al., 2011; Casanova, 2007). Furthermore, it is documented that Muslim-Americans have higher household incomes than their non-Muslim and non-immigrant counterparts in America (Britto and Amer, 2007; Savelkoul et al., 2011). While this evidence supports Foner & Alba’s (2008) statement that Muslim immigrants have integrated better economically in the U.S. than in Europe, it is overly reductionist. Arguably it is the sociodemographic advantages of Muslim-Americans (prior to migration) that has enabled successful economic integration, rather than differences in the host society or reception of Muslims in America.

Political Representation of Muslims

Despite France having a long history of immigration they are the least inclusive European country when it comes to representing migrants in local, regional and national politics. While France has a large proportion of Franco-Arab/Muslim citizens, visible minorities are “staggeringly absent” from the political realm (Bird, 2005). Furthermore, immigrants from non-EU countries are less represented and enjoy less political autonomy in European-level politics. While efforts in the 1980s were unsuccessful in electing ethnic and religious minorities to significant political positions, some progress has been made since the start of the millennium. However, according to Bird (2005) there has been resistance to electing Muslims in the French political sphere, especially at national level. French Muslims who have been elected to the Republic under the “minority-friendly” Nicholas Sarkozy have been described as politically “moderate” (Bird, 2005). An ideology of “non-differentiation” between indigenous French citizens and citizens of immigrant descent, has purposely marginalised immigrants from politics (Bird, 2005). A lack of representation has a “cumulative effect” on the voices and agency of minorities, particularly Muslims who are expected to shed their visible signs of “difference” to achieve everyday civic rights. Ultimately, underrepresentation serves to undermine the incorporation of Muslims in mainstream French society and reinforces an assimilative model whereby French identity is only recognised as long as visible signs of “difference”, particularly those of “religious affiliation”, are shed (Bird, 2005).

Similarly to France, Muslim-Americans are underrepresented in national politics. According to Awad (2010) Muslim-Americans are perceived most favourably in political spheres when they have had high levels of immersion into the dominant society culture and place less value onto their ethnic identity. Furthermore, high ethnic identification with one’s “Arabness” and religious affiliation is said to undermine the potential for “agreeable” acculturation to the host society (Awad, 2010). In addition, Awad (2010) found that Christian-
Arabs acculturated into the host society with less cultural conflict, due to their lack of affiliation with Islam. This undermines Foner & Alba’s (2008) argument that religious pluralism has an “Americanizing” effect or that religious plurality underpins American identity in general. It would appear that religious affiliation outside of the mainstream “Judeo-Christian” model hinders civic integration. Recent “progress” has seen Keith Ellison, representative of Minnesota district congress, promoted to DNC chair and be the first Muslim-American to be elected to Congress. However, Ellison remains an outlier in American politics and is likely to be subject to unjustified interrogations of his identity, negotiating the political arena as both an ethnic and religious minority. This evidence arguably demonstrates that despite immigrants’ efforts to acculturate successfully, the host society essentially sets the “agenda” for what is considered acceptable and what is “American”.

Social Inclusion

Foner & Alba’s (2008) discussion of migrants’ integration into host societies lacks depth when it comes to non-quantifiable measures of integration. For example, presenting Islam as an “oppositional identity”, in response to religious discrimination is fundamentally problematic. Firstly, Foner & Alba (2008) essentially equate terrorism with the Islamic faith by stating that the second generation’s “possible involvement in…fundamentalist Islam may lead to acts of violence and terrorism” (343). This indicates that embracing Islamic identity to any extent in the Western world and Europe in particular, will facilitate radical action or extremism. Secondly, they discuss the “social isolation” of Muslim migrants in Europe as if self-inflicted. While they acknowledge that discrimination against Muslim identity exists, the burden of social integration remains on Islamic folks. Social integration of Muslim migrants into American society is nearly impossible, due to the lack of acceptance for Islam as a mainstream religion. Approximately one quarter of Americans believe that it should be illegal for Muslims to meet for “religious purposes” (Foner & Alba, 2008). This evidence contradicts the argument that religious freedom is a social reality for all Americans. Foner & Alba’s discussion of migrant integration fails to go beyond an individualistic approach that blames migrants for failing to integrate in the social realm of the host country. The following section will turn its focus on the host society population and the impact that their potential biases and anti-Muslim attitudes can have on impeding productive intercultural relations.

Acculturation of Muslim Immigrants

Acculturation is the “dual process of cultural and psychological change” that takes place in intercultural relations between two or more ethno-cultural groups (Berry, 2005; 698). Four distinct acculturation “strategies” have been theorised within the literature, include integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalisation (Berry, 2005). While the focus of this paper is on the integration of Islamic immigrants into the US and France, it can be argued that these host countries often engage in assimilative acculturation practices. Aggressive assimilative models place expectations on incoming migrants to rid their difference and become indistinguishable from the indigenous population. Berry (2005) states that a preference for migrant integration requires larger societal practices to adopt “multiculturalism” as an approach to accommodate intercultural differences. Furthermore, Berry (2005) claims that both parties pursuing a path of integration should reduce “acculturative stress” and potential intercultural conflict.

However, hostile receptions of migrants and the tendency for host populations to favour assimilation of migrants, increases the likelihood of cultural conflict. As outlined by Berry (2005) host countries often “strive to maintain their societies in the face of increasing cultural diversity” (700). Acculturation strategies are underpinned by two main principles. Firstly, attitudes towards acculturation processes and in particular the negotiation that is needed between ethno-cultural groups to accommodate intercultural relations. Secondly, the behaviour and day-to-day activities between immigrants and host society members determines how acculturative ideologies are put into practice (Berry, 2005). Analysing the existing attitudes and behaviours between immigrants and members of the dominant society should indicate the nature of acculturative strategies being undertaken. The next section will analyse the practices of acculturation that the dominant group has favoured in both France and the US.
Anti-Muslim attitudes in France

According to Casanova (2007), Islamophobic rhetoric has emerged in Europe due to the “fusion” of prejudicial Western ideologies. For example, Casanova (2007) cites liberal-feminist ideologies as a critique of “Muslim patriarchal fundamentalism” that essentially frames all Muslim women as oppressed. Casanova (2007) affirms that such ideologies assist the legitimization of Islamophobia when fused with xenophobia, nativism, and religious prejudice. Viewpoints such as those expressed by far-right Front National member Jean-Marie Le Pen frame Islam as “unassimilable” and too “foreign” for Western culture (Casanova, 2007). National policies are based on religious prejudice and ethnic superiority which in many ways require French Muslims to “give up their cultural identity…for the full benefits of French citizenship” (Bird, 2005; 438). This is idiosyncratic of invasive assimilationist models of migrant integration. The findings from Adida et al. (2010) indicate that Muslims experience significant religious discrimination in France. Despite the near “complete secularization” of Europe in the past hundred years, the notion of “Christian Europe” persists (Adida et al., 2010) and France is by no means an exception. Adida et al. (2010) found that 90% of participants agreed that Muslims experience the most religious prejudice of all faiths in French society (Adida et al., 2010). With little accommodation being made by the host society, the burden of acculturation into European societies essentially remains on migrants.

Anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe are often justified by values of patriotism. Until recently hate crimes and immigrant discrimination went undocumented in France, due to the value of “non-differentiation” between French citizens (Bird, 2005). This has meant that ethnic or racial discrimination of French citizens with migrant heritage went unrecorded and unpunished, as racial “categories” were assumed not to exist amongst the French population (Bird, 2005). Furthermore, anti-Islamic sentiment can be implemented into policies such as that of laïcité, which fundamentally undermines the value of religious freedom. For example, the “headscarf ban” in French public schools only applies to religious symbols of Islamic identity (the hijab in this case), but not to “discreet” religious symbols such as the Jewish “kippa” or golden Christian cross (El Hamel, 2002). Anti-Islamic attitudes in Europe can therefore seek to undermine the autonomy of immigrants in the host country and impedes integration in many sectors of society.

Anti-Muslim attitudes in the U.S.

Despite the religious pluralism of the United States, anti-Muslim attitudes are just as preeminent in the U.S. as they are in Europe. Kalkan et al. (2009) argue that anti-Islamic sentiment in the U.S. is not a consequence of the 9/11 attacks or recent Islamic fundamentalism, but are a product of intolerance to “outgroups”. Social identity theory claims that we are intolerant and untrusting of people who we see as “different” to ourselves (Kalkan et al., 2009). Awad (2010) found that Arab-Muslims experienced significantly more discrimination than Arab-Christians. Awad (2010) argues that because Muslims are visible religious minorities, due to cues such as dress wear, they are more “vulnerable to discrimination and bigotry” (60). According to Foner & Alba (2008) one in four Americans would agree with the proposition of making Islamic religious meetings illegal. In a study conducted by Kalkan et al. (2009) findings show that even when ethnic minority status is controlled for, Muslim-Americans experience discrimination on the grounds of their religion.

However, religious discrimination against Muslim-Americans and French Muslims is exacerbated by their belonging to other minority groups. Kalkan et al. (2009) attend that Muslims essentially belong to two “bands of others”. By virtue of being both religious and cultural minorities, they essentially experience “othering” twice when attempting to acculturate. Furthermore, the racialization of Islamic folks and ethnic minority status also increases the likelihood of Muslims to experience discrimination (Casanova, 2007). “Mainstream” Americans (White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestants) tend to hold indiscriminate prejudice of varying degrees against all societal “outgroups”, such as people of colour, LGBTQ+ folk and religious minorities (Kalkan et al., 2009). Muslim-Americans therefore face multiple competing obstacles in the acculturation process, due to their religious, ethnic, and cultural differences to the dominant host population.

Anti-Islamic sentiment and xenophobia emerge from intercultural conflict between migrants and the host society. As already outlined, conflict between the host population and Muslim immigrants develops from fear of the
other” (Berry, 2005; Kalkan et al., 2009). Social contact theory contends that increasing contact with Muslim immigrants should reduce prejudiced attitudes of host society members and minimise intercultural conflict (Thompson & Crul, 2007). From the analysis it appears that prejudicial views of the dominant group in the host society can leak into structural aspect of integration, as well as impede social inclusion and cohesion. Fundamentally, anti-Islamic attitudes in the host society increase the likelihood that Muslim migrants will face barriers to structural and non-structural forms of integration.

Conclusions

The evidence presented shows that the “integration” of migrants into a host society is a complex and multi-faceted process. Foner & Alba’s thesis partially addresses the different aspects of integration, namely acculturation processes, labour market participation and civic activity. However, they fail to address dimensions of migrants’ lives in the host society that are essential to the fundamental goals of equality, such as experiences of discrimination, issues of representation and social inclusion. Limiting the definition of migrant integration to structural measures of equality gives a reductionist viewpoint of existing intercultural relations, in both the U.S. and in Europe. Furthermore, Foner & Alba (2008) fail to distinguish between the different immigration policies and cultural contexts of nation states in Europe, essentially paint a homogenous picture of the continent. While Western European societies are undoubtedly defined by Christian heritage and increasing secularism, they do not have identical immigration policies. Therefore, migrants’ experiences will likely differ depending on the host society they settle in and how their own religious, ethnic and cultural identity is perceived by the indigenous population of the host country.

This paper has focused on the abstract social realities and structural barriers that Muslim migrants face in host societies, dimensions of integration which are largely out of their control. To date, research on migrant integration strategies has focused almost solely on the behaviour and action of migrants, rather than on that of the host population. While some of the evidence presented in the paper supports Foner & Alba’s thesis, the evidence provided paints an often hostile reception for Muslim migrants in both France and the US. Overwhelmingly, it seems that Muslim migrants face growing discrimination in the Western world. While Muslim-Americans of migrant descent appear to have integrated “better”, this is most likely due to differences in socio-economic status. Research on lived experiences indicates that Muslim migrants in the U.S. and France face much more similar fates in the US and France, than Foner & Alba’s thesis might suggest.

However, there are many limitations to the analysis of this paper. Firstly, an assessment of the validity of Foner & Alba’s (2008) thesis was only tested using information on the lived experiences of Muslim migrants in the US and France. Secondly and most importantly, more time could have been invested into the investigation on the multiplicity of Muslim migrants’ identities, who are by all means a very diverse group. Further time should be invested into researching different cohorts of Muslim migrants and differences in their lived experiences, particularly by socioeconomic status, country of origin, ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation. Lastly, an inquiry into positive integration narratives of Muslims in both cultural contexts could have added depth to the evidence presented in the analysis. Despite limitations, the argument presented in this paper rebukes Foner & Alba’s (2008) thesis and concludes that religion acts more as a barrier to migrant integration, due to the hostile reception of Western host populations.
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